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INTRODUCTION
The history of humanity amply supports the belief that war is hell.
Indeed, war in many respects continues to get more hellish, as illustrated
by recent armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. To
date, the search for more humane methods of war have been largely
ethical (e.g., the Christian just war theory)' or legal (e.g., the interna-
tional law on armed conflict).2 Ethics and international law have since
the late nineteenth century been losing a running battle with technologi-
cal developments that have vastly increased the killing power of military
forces. In addition, ethnic hatred and ineffective or non-existent gov-
ernments have fueled the ferocious fires of civil war in many parts of the
developing world, deepening the crisis for ethical and legal restraints on
war. Military forces from various nations ordered into war-torn societies
to keep the peace or distribute humanitarian aid often find themselves
confronted with non-military functions, such as crowd control, that seem
difficult to fulfill with traditional military weapons.
1. On the Christian just war theory, see STANLEY HOFFMANN, DUTIES BEYOND BOR-
DERS 47-55 (1981).
2. On the international law on armed conflict, see for example L. C. GREEN, THE CON-
TEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1993).
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This bleak landscape explains much of the government,3 defense in-
dustry,4 scholarly,5 and popular media6 interest that has developed, and is
3. Interest in "non-lethal" weapons has been manifest in a number of national police
and military forces. In the United States, for example, the National Institute of Justice oper-
ates the Less-Than-Lethal Technology Program. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, NIJ's
LESS-THAN-LETHAL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (1999); The Department of Defense coordinates
the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS DIRECTORATE, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM: 1998 A YEAR OF PROG-
REss (1999) [hereinafter JNLWD 1998 REPORT]. "Non-lethal" weapons have also attracted
the attention of leading U.S. foreign policy think tanks. See, e.g. Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects, Report of 1999 Independent Task
Force on Nonlethal Weapons, (visited Nov. 20, 1999) <http://www.foreignrelations.org/
public/pubs/Non-ViolentTaskForce.html>. Prior to its collapse, the Soviet Union apparently
conducted significant scientific research on technologies relevant to "non-lethal" weapons,
such as microwaves and electromagnetic energy. See The Technology Bazaar US Reaps Har-
vest of Soviet Science, INT'L DEF. REV., Sept. 1, 1993, at 697, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ALLNWS File. After opposing "non-lethal" weapons, France changed course and
began to consider their integration into French armed forces. See J.A.C. Lewis, France Re-
verses Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons, JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, Feb. 3, 1999, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File. Britain has also conducted research and develop-
ment on "non-lethal" weapons. See Andrew Gilligan & Rob Evans, Sticky End for Foes as
MoD Tests New Breed of Weapons, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 6, 1998, at 17,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File. Swedish defense scientists are also at
work on "non-lethal" weapons. See Ron Laytner, New-Age Guns Which Don't Shoot to Kill,
SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Jan. 4, 1998, at 15, available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS
File. NATO, too, has become involved with "non-lethal" weapons. See NATO Debates Non-
Lethal Weapons, INT'L DEFENSE REV., Dec. 1, 1996, at 12, available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, ALLNWS File; Brooks Tigner, NATO Panel to Consider Nonlethal Weapon
Guidelines, DEFENSE NEWS, Sept. 29, 1997, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ALLNWS File. Even the Prime Minister of Malaysia has spoken out in favor of "non-lethal"
weapons. See Switch Production to Non-Lethal Weapons: PM, NEW STRAIT TIMES, Dec. 3,
1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.
4. Frequent reporting on "non-lethal" weapons in defense industry publications seems
to have begun in the early 1990's. See, e.g., Barbara Amouyal, Use of Nonlethal Weapons
May Alter Military Strategy, DEFENSE NEWS, Nov. 19, 1990, at 7, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ALLNWS File; Neil Munro, Task Force Urges Study of Non-Lethal Weapons, DE-
FENSE NEWS, Aug. 5, 1991, at 38, available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File;
Barbara Opall, Pentagon Forges Strategy on Non-Lethal Warfare, DEFENSE NEWS, Feb. 17,
1992, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.
5. Scholarly interest is reflected in numerous publications, including JOHN B. ALEXAN-
DER, FUTURE WAR: NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN MODERN WARFARE (1999); NICK LEWER &
STEVEN SCHOFIELD, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: A FATAL ATTRACTION? (1997)[hereinafter
LEWER & SCHOFIELD, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS]; MALCOM DANDO, A NEW FORM OF WAR-
FARE: THE RISE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (1996) [hereinafter DANDO, A NEW FORM];
Malcom Dando, Non-Lethal Weapons, in THE CENTRE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES, BRASSEY'S
DEFENSE YEARBOOK 1996, at 393 (King's College London eds., 1996)[hereinafter Dando,
Non-Lethal Weapons]. At least two universities have established specific "non-lethal"
weapons research efforts. See University of Bradford's Non-Lethal Weapons Research Proj-
ect (visited Aug. 11, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw> and Penn State University's
Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies (visited Aug. 11, 1999) <http://
www.arl.psu.edu/core/ nonlethal>.
6. The popular media has also picked up on the growing interest in "non-lethal" weap-
ons. See, e.g., Douglas Pasternak, Wonder Weapons: The Pentagon's Quest for Nonlethal
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growing, in new military technologies variously called "less-than-
lethal," "sub-lethal," or "non-lethal" weapons. After more than a cen-
tury of the development of ever more devastating weapons, can science
and technology finally be harnessed to make warfare more humane? Can
we finally escape the seeming futility of relying only on ethics and in-
ternational law to restrain the dogs of war? Are "non-lethal" weapons
early beacons of the possible development of warfare without mortality?'
The depth of the crisis with ethical and international legal controls
on armed conflict helps make the development of "non-lethal" weapon
technology appealing because the concept of "non-lethal" weapons re-
stores some hope to the fundamental value of regulating armed conflict.
The tantalizing vision of "non-lethal" warfare should not, however, ren-
der military and civilian leadership insensitive to the problems lurking
within the "non-lethal" weapons concept and its potential application.
Realism in military circles may keep enthusiasm for "non-lethal" weap-
ons in check, but the concept and its technological possibilities have
captured the imagination of military and civilian leaders enough for a
global push for "non-lethal" weapons development to emerge.
The development of "non-lethal" weapons contains many important
issues that must be resolved, ranging from the scientific to the tactical. One
very important issue that has not been fully explored in connection with
"non-lethal" weapons is the international legal implications of the devel-
opment and potential use of these weapons. While analysis of "non-lethal"
weapons frequently mentions the importance of international law, the
analysis of the international legal issues is usually either not sustained or
comprehensive.9
In this Article, I attempt a comprehensive international legal analysis
of "non-lethal" weapons to raise awareness about how many international
legal issues they create and about the complexity of analyzing the interna-
tional legality of the development and use of these weapons. In short, the
emergence of "non-lethal" weapons does not rescue international law from
its crisis in connection with controlling war. Indeed, in some respects, the
coming of "non-lethal" weapons threatens to deepen that crisis in new and
disturbing ways.
Arms is Amazing. But Is It Smart?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 7, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File; John Barry & Tom Morgenthau, Soon, 'Phasers on
Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24.
7. This article follows the custom that has developed of calling these weapons "non-
lethal".
8. This prospect was captured in the headline of a magazine article. See Corey S. Pow-
ell, War Without Death-Nonlethal Weapons, DISCOVER, Apr. 1, 1999, at 29.
9. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 189-99 (analyzing legal considerations in
connection with "non-lethal" weapons); LEWER & SCHOFIELD, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS, su-
pra note 5, at 81-100 (analyzing legal and ethical dilemmas posed by "non-lethal" weapons).
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My analysis begins with an examination of the concept of "non-lethal"
weapons, the purposes behind their development, the types of "non-lethal"
weapons technologies that exist, and the controversies surrounding these
weapons (Part I). Then I engage in a sustained international legal analysis
of the concept, development, and potential use of "non-lethal" weapons
(Part 11). Given the embryonic nature of "non-lethal" weapons develop-
ment and integration into military forces and strategies, much of the
international legal analysis unfolds in a vacuum of precedent, which gives
the analysis an abstract and, at times, speculative quality. Thus, my inter-
national legal analysis can be only preliminary in nature.
From the sustained international legal analysis, I attempt to identify
a general international legal approach that is necessary to evaluate the
development and potential use of "non-lethal" weapons as a matter of
international law. The message behind this international legal approach
is that international legal scrutiny and vigilance will be necessary to help
prevent "non-lethal" weapons from deepening the crisis of international
law on armed conflict. The tension between "non-lethal" weapons and
international law brings to mind the old saying that the path to hell is
often paved with good intentions.
I. "NON-LETHAL" WEAPONS: CONCEPT, PURPOSES, TYPES, AND
CONTROVERSIES
A. The Difficult Concept of "Non-Lethal" Weapons
Any analysis of "non-lethal" weapons has to confront difficulties
that arise with their definition. To some, the term "'non-lethal' weapons"
is an oxymoron.' ° Others find the use of "non-lethal" to describe these
emerging weapons systems as misleading because "non-lethal" weapons
can cause fatalities and thus have lethality." But others believe the term
is appropriate because it arguably captures the essence of these new
weapons: unlike conventional weapons, "non-lethal" weapons are de-
signed not to destroy or kill but to incapacitate personnel, equipment,
10. Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, Non-Lethal Weapons (visited Apr. 20, 1999)
<http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw> (noting that term "non-lethal" has been criticized as an
oxymoron); Non-Lethal Technology, 163 AEROSPACE DAILY, Aug. 24, 1992, at 312, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (citing Pentagon officials as saying "non-lethal
weapon" was an oxymoron).
11. See Dominique Loye, "Non-Lethal" Weapons and International Humanitarian Law,
paper presented at Jane's Non-Lethal Weapons Conference, London (Dec. 1-2, 1998), at 5
(on file with author)(arguing that "the term 'non-lethal' is misleading"); Eric Rosenberg,
Pentagon Memo Seeks to Better Explain 'Non-Lethal' Weaponry, DEFENSE WEEK, Mar. 6,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (reporting Pentagon memorandum
warning that the term "non-lethal" is a misnomer because "non-lethal" weapons can kill).
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and electronic systems, 2 giving military commanders facing new opera-
tional tasks more flexibility in strategy and tactics."
Another conceptual difficulty arises in connection with the wide va-
riety of weapons to which the term "non-lethal" is applied.'4 The term
"non-lethal" suggests that the weapons in question are anti-personnel
weapons only. 5 The Oxford English Dictionary defines "lethal" as
"causing or capable of causing death."' 6 The area of "non-lethal" weap-
ons covers, however, more than anti-personnel weapons. It includes
weapons designed for use against vehicles, equipment, materiel, and
computer systems (collectively "anti-mat6riel" weapons)." Describing
these anti-matriel weapons as "non-lethal" does not accurately reflect
their purpose or nature. In addition, use of some of these anti-matdriel
"non-lethal" weapons can be lethal as vehicle, equipment, or materiel
failure places the human operators in mortal danger.
Further clouding the meaning of the concept of "non-lethal" weap-
ons is the fact that many lethal weapons, such as rifle bullets and other
fragmentation weapons, do not have a 100% lethality rate. Doctors with
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimate that the
lethality rate for wounds from rifles and fragmentation weapons is ap-
proximately 20-25%.'" Most wounds caused, thus, by "lethal" weapons
do not result in lethality. More sinister practices used in times of war,
12. See Loye, supra note 11, at 1 (noting that a widely used definition of "non-lethal"
weapons is weapons that are "explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate
personnel and materiel, while minimising fatalities, permanent injury, and undesired damage
to property and the environment."); ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 5 ("Non-lethal, while far
from being a perfect word, does provide an adequate context from which to address the issues
related to diminishing the number of collateral fatalities...").
13. General Dennis Reimer, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, argued that "[w]e need to provide
our soldiers an alternative to deadly force.... Non-lethal weapons provide this alternative while
retaining the capability to protect our soldiers and non-combatants in complex and potentially
volatile situations." JNLWD 1998 REPORT, supra note 3, at inside cover (quoting General Den-
nis Reimer); ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 6-7 ("In conjunction with lethal weapons, they ["non-
lethal" weapons] provide military commanders with additional options... ").
14. See Table 1 infra for list of different "non-lethal" weapons technologies.
15. See Robin M. Coupland, "Non-Lethal" Weapons: Precipitating a New Arms Race,
315 BRIT. MED. J. 72, 72 (1997)(arguing that a "'weapon' is something designed to cause
bodily harm; technologies designed specifically to damage inanimate objects should not be
considered in the same context.").
16. NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1570 (1993).
17. See, e.g., JNLWD 1998 REPORT, supra note 3, at 6, 8-10 (describing the Portable
Vehicle Immobilization System (PVIS), Vessel Stopper System (VVS), and Ground
(Electrical) Vehicle Stoppers (GVS)).
18. See Coupland, supra note 15, at 72. See also Robin M. Coupland & David R. Med-
dings, Mortality Associated with the Use of Weapons in Armed Conflicts, Wartime Atrocities,
and Civilian Mass Shootings: Literature Review, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 407, 408 (1999)(reporting
that in armed conflicts since 1940 "[t]otal deaths were never more than 26% of all casualites").
[Vol. 21:51
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such as rape, are also largely "non-lethal" but are nevertheless univer-
sally condemned.' 9
Another complicating factor in understanding the concept of "non-
lethal" weapons is the supposed newness of these types of weapons.
Various types of "non-lethal" weapons technologies have, however,
been around for a long time, as has the concept of more humane weap-
ons. 0 Many of the "non-lethal" weapons that can actually be deployed
today were developed decades ago, such as tear gas, rubber bullets, and
bean bag rifles and grenades. It is important to understand why in the
1990's the concept of "non-lethal" weapons has gained such prominence
when many of the technologies and their uses are quite old.
B. Reasons Behind the Recent Interest in "Non-Lethal" Weapons
Recent interest in the concept of "non-lethal" weapons arises
through the confluence of a number of factors: (1) technological devel-
opments; (2) changes in the roles of military forces (e.g., military
operations other than war, such as peacekeeping or peace building op-
erations); (3) continued pressure on military forces to retain competitive
advantages against potential State and non-State adversaries; (4) contin-
ued moral and legal pressure exerted by international law on armed
conflict; and (5) military "marketing." Thus, the concept of "non-lethal"
weapons is very complex and needs to be examined rigorously so that all
its features are understood. Simple definitions will not suffice. "Non-
lethal" weapons are a phenomenon, not just new types of weapons.
Grasping the phenomenon requires understanding the reasons why "non-
lethal" weapons are being pursued today.
As with other types of weapons developments, technology has
played a key role in the rise of "non-lethal" weapons. Advances in vari-
ous scientific fields, such as biology, chemistry, electromagnetism,
computers, electronics, and acoustics, are producing new opportunities
for weapons development.2 ' The key feature of these technological
19. See Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, art. 7(l)(g), 27 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Statute of the International Criminal
Court] (recognizing rape as a crime against humanity).
20. See DANDO, A NEW Foam, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that, although "non-lethal"
weapons came to prominence in the 1990's, "these ["non-lethal"] technologies and ideas have
a much longer history.").
21. See id. at 11-12 (listing newer technologies that are frequently mentioned in the lit-
erature as "non-lethal" weapons). Some of these technologies, such as acoustics, have cruder
applications as "non-lethal" weapons. See Noise Annoyed Noriega?, INT'L DEFENSE REV.,
Apr. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (noting that "[t]o force Gen-
eral Manuel Noriega out of his sanctuary [after the U.S. invasion of Panama] without
destroying it US forces resorted to bombarding the building with loud music-an innovative
use of a "non-lethal" weapon.").
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developments is that many of them do not escalate the destructive power
of weapons but provide a different kind of weapons technology that
might serve different tactical and strategic military roles.
Perhaps the most frequently mentioned reason behind the develop-
ment of the "non-lethal" weapons concept is the changing nature of
military operations in the post-Cold War world.2 United Nations forces,
NATO forces, and the national military forces of various nations have
participated in what are called "military operations other than war." The
most notable of these types of operations are peacekeeping, peace
building, or humanitarian missions, such as occurred in Somalia, Haiti,
Cambodia, and Bosnia. In such operations, military forces take on roles
akin to domestic police for which their traditional military weapons may
not always be appropriate. Military forces engaged in such conflicts
need more weapons options, and experts argue that "non-lethal" weap-
ons provide those options.23
A more traditional purpose behind the "non-lethal" weapons move-
ment is the age-old need of military forces to retain a competitive
advantage over potential adversaries in weapons, tactics, and strategies.
The argument basically comes in one of two forms. First, "non-lethal"
weapons can add to a military force's arsenal and give it advantages in
combat and other military operations over potential adversaries. Not
only do these new weapons give military forces flexibility in the field,
but they may also create tactical and strategic advantages that advance
the capabilities of "lethal" weapons to accomplish missions effectively.
As the U.S. Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) put it,
"NLWs can critically supplement and augment lethal force in the bat-
tlespace of the future." 24 Second, attention to "non-lethal" weapons is
necessary as part of the competitive equilibrium with potential State and
non-State adversaries as they might be developing these new weapons
systems to give themselves a military advantage. 2 For defensive pur-
22. See JNLWD 1998 REPORT, supra note 3, at I (discussing new military challenges of
small scale contingencies, operations other than war, and military operations in urban terrain
as reasons behind the U.S. military's interest in "non-lethal" weapons); DANDO, A NEW
FORM, supra note 5, at 1-8 (discussing role of peacekeeping in chaotic conflicts as fueling
interest in "non-lethal" weapons).
23. See JNLWD 1998 REPORT, supra note 3, at I ("Deployments to Somalia, Haiti and
Bosnia, which are probably similar to the environments our armed forces will confront in the
future, confirmed the operational need for non-lethal weapons.").
24. Id. at 1.
25. See Loye, supra note 11, at 3 ("The naive hope that new weapons technology will
stay in the hands of the 'good guys' has been dashed time and time again. History shows that
once an undesired technology has left Pandora's box it will sooner rather than later find its
way into the 'wrong hands'."); Robert J. Bunker, National Security Implications of Emerging
Forms of Warfare, paper presented at First Annual Non-Lethal Technology and Academic
[Vol. 21:51
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poses at least, the offensive potential of "non-lethal" weapons needs to
be understood, and countermeasures created to avoid losing battlefield
advantage.
"Non-lethal" weapons are also attractive to many military and civil-
ian personnel because they seemingly respond to the duties laid out in
international humanitarian law, such as the duty not to use weapons that
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.26 It is more humane to
incapacitate the enemy than to kill him. "Non-lethal" weapons are, the
argument goes, more in tune with international humanitarian law than
many conventional weapons now used by military forces. "Non-lethal"
weapons may, in certain circumstances, lead to greater compliance with
the laws of war.
A final influence in the "non-lethal" weapons movement is the propa-
ganda value of the concept of "non-lethality." The persistence of advocates
of "non-lethal" weapons in using "non-lethal" to describe these new
weapons technologies is not an accident. As noted before, the term "non-
lethal" is not an accurate description of these weapons because they can be
lethal and they include anti-materiel weapons. Further, military command-
ers looking at the battlefields of the future may want to combine "non-
lethal" and "lethal" weapons to achieve more effective destruction of the
enemy.2' Adding to this notion is the fact that many "non-lethal" weapons
programs are operated "behind a veil of considerable secrecy."28 In many
Research Symposium, Quantico, Virginia (May 3-5, 1999), (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://
www.unh.edu/orps/nonlethality/pub/proceedingsl999.html#posters> (arguing that with "non-
lethal" weapons available to non-state actors such as terrorists, guerillas, or mercenaries, "I
think we are going to have to redefine the battlespace dimensionality and homeland defense
against the bad guys.").
26. This duty is enshrined in numerous international legal documents including the St.
Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp. 1907); the
Second Hague Peace Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, Regu-
lations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(e),
reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 90, 106 (Supp. 1908); Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 35, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I];
and Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter UN Conventional
Weapons Convention].
27. See Loye, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that "[in certain development programmes, the
'non-lethal' weapons are ... intended to augment the deadly (lethal) forces of conventional
weapons."); DANDO, A NEW FORM, supra note 5, at 25 ("We are not dealing with ideas of
better, more benign, peacekeeping but with an expanded view of standard military opera-
tions.").
28. See DANDO, A NEW FORM, supra note 5, at 26.
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respects, "non-lethal" weapons should not be distinguished from other
types of weapons considered "lethal."
But the term "non-lethal" persists not because more accurate terms
cannot be found but because it is easier for the military to market "non-
lethal" weapons in military and civilian contexts. The concept of "non-
lethal" weapons is "politically correct" because it obscures the potential
lethality of the weapons themselves, misleads people in how the military
is actually thinking about the weapons, and conjures up images of
kinder, gentler warfare. 29 The concept of "non-lethal" weapons connects
with the revulsion ordinary citizens of peaceful, stable democracies feel
through the "CNN effect" of horrid pictures of death and destruction in
international and civil armed conflict caused by "lethal" weapons.0 The
concept of "non-lethal" weapons is a dream come true for the marketing
of new military weaponry.
C. Classifying Weapons as "Non-Lethal"
As mentioned earlier, one difficulty with the concept of "non-lethal"
weapons is figuring out what exactly is a "non-lethal" weapon. Much
confusion exists in the literature on "non-lethal" weapons about what
weapons fall under this moniker. Some categorizations rely on the tech-
nological differences in "non-lethal" weapons systems: whether they use
chemicals, biological agents, electricity, acoustics, or electromagnetism
as the operative technology (see Table 1). The technological diversity of
"non-lethal" weapons is impressive and is part of what makes them in-
teresting.3' But such technology-driven lists are not very helpful in
categorizing "non-lethal" weapons because it avoids dealing with the
obscurity created by the concept of "non-lethal" weapons.
29. See Coupland, supra note 15, at 72 ("The euphemisms and political correctness that
surround the moral, legal, media, and tactical aspects of warfare of the future are complex and
bizarre.").
30. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 165-67 (discussing the importance of the "CNN effect"
in connection with the development of "non-lethal" weapons); see Mark Walsh, Marines
Hope Non-Lethal Weapons Cut Civilian Casualties, DEFENSE WEEK, Jan. 2, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (reporting U.S. Marine Commandant as indicating
that "[i]nstead of dead civilians, television tape of future conflicts could depict innocent by-
standers battling heavy lubricants to stay on their feet, holding their noses or being stuck to
sidewalks by powerful but harmless glues").
31. For more detailed analysis of "non-lethal" weapons technology, see ALEXANDER, su-
pra note 5, at 57-123 (examining major "non-lethal" weapons technologies) and LEWER &
SCHOFIELD, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS, supra note 5, at 10-15 (analyzing the main "non-lethal"
weapons technologies).
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TABLE I. NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF "NON-LETHAL" TECHNOLOGIES
Type of Technology Examples Target(s)
Acoustical High-Frequency Sound Personnel
- Low-Frequency Sound Personnel
- Polysound Personnel
- Shrill Noise Personnel
Biological - Biodegrading Microbes Matdriel
- Disease Microbes Personnel
- Disease-Transmitting Personnel
Arthropods
Chemical - Riot Control Agents Personnel
- Calmatives Personnel
- Nausea/Vomit Inducers Personnel
- Olfactory Agents Personnel
- Corrosives Materiel
- Superiubricants Materiel/Personnel
- Adhesives Materiel/Personnel
- Embrittling Agents Matdriel
Digital - Computer Viruses Matdriel
- Computer Worms Materiel
Electrical - Electric Shock Personnel
- Electrical System Materiel
Disruptors
- Electronic Jamming Materiel
Electromagnetic - Electromagnetic Pulses Materel/Personnel
- Microwaves Materiel/Personnel
Environmental - Weather Modification Materiel/Personnel
- Ionospheric Modification Materiel
- Herbicides Personnel
Kinetic - Water Cannon Personnel
- Air Cannon Personnel
- Blunt Object Mines Personnel
- Blunt Object Ammunition Personnel
Mechanical - Caltrops Materiel
- Entanglers Personnel
- Robots Materiel
Optical - Lasers Materiel/Personnel
- Flash Grenades Personnel
-Obscurants Materiel
- Holographic Projections Personnel
Psychological - Propaganda Personnel
- Misinformation Personnel
- Psychological Operations Personnel
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In its Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, the U.S. Department of De-
fense defines "non-lethal" weapons as those "that are explicitly designed
and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material,
while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and unde-
sired damage to property and the environment."32 This definition
contains a number of interesting features. First, it supports the conclu-
sion that the term "non-lethal" is misleading because it only refers to
"minimizing fatalities." Second, it is not clear whether the objective of
minimizing permanent injury objective applies to all military personnel
in a conflict or just members of the U.S. armed forces. Third, the focus
in the definition is solely on the intent behind the weapon's development
and use with no mention of actual or foreseeable consequences of its
use. Fourth, it is not clear what "undesired damage to property and the
environment" means. "Undesired" from whose perspective? A desirable
or tolerable level of damage from a military point of view may differ
greatly from the property owner's or environmentalist's standard of de-
sirability. Finally, the definition as a whole allows for subjective rather
than objective analysis of what might be "non-lethal."
An important attempt to come up with an objective definition of
"non-lethal" weapons has been made by the Health Effects Advisory
Panel (HEAP) established by the U.S. JNLWD.33 According to HEAP, a
weapon can be classified as "non-lethal" if it meets the following crite-
ria: (1) the weapon incapacitates 98% of the persons it is used against;
(2) the weapon has no effect on no more than 1% of persons; (3) no
more than % of persons suffer permanent physical damage; and (4) no
more than % of persons are killed.34 Using these criteria, HEAP con-
cluded that no current so-called "non-lethal" weapon met this
definition.3" Yet, the U.S. military, defense experts, and civilian politi-
cians continue to refer to these weapons systems as "non-lethal."
Further eroding the legitimacy of classifying weapons as "non-
lethal" is the apparent paucity of evidence about the physical and health
effects of any of the weapons in question.36 HEAP has, for example,
32. Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, U.S. Dep't of Def. Directive No. 3000.3, para. C
(July 9, 1996).
33. JNLWD 1998 REPORT, supra note 3, at 19 (discussing establishment of HEAP and
its task to develop a definition of "non-lethal" weapons).
34. See John Kenny, Potential Health Effects of Non-Lethal Weapons, paper presented at
First Annual Non-Lethal Technology and Academic Research Symposium, Quantico, Vir-
ginia (May 3-5, 1999), (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www.unh.edu/orps/nonlethality/
pub/proceedings 1999.html#posters>.
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Coupland, supra note 15, at 73 ("The precise effects of each of these new
weapons are unknown ....").
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criticized the U.S. military's methodology for analyzing the bioeffects of
weapons as scientifically inadequate.37 HEAP has noted that, outside
pepper spray, the Department of Defense has no physical effects data on
"non-lethal" weapons and that no valid data on incapacitation or blunt
trama injury exists.3' Yet the U.S. military and others persist in calling
these weapons "non-lethal."
HEAP's analyses clearly raise the legitimacy of classifying weapons
as "non-lethal." Outside of the "marketing" appeal of the moniker "non-
lethal," there seems no compelling military reason to call a weapon
"lethal" or "non-lethal." The objective of the military mission, the con-
text in which it is undertaken, and the international legal rules on armed
conflict determine weapon choice and use, not general weapons classifi-
cations. In fact, the military's penchant for the term "non-lethal" may
come back to haunt the entire project. By calling weapons "non-lethal,"
the military invites close scrutiny of the health effects of such weapons,
which has already started to take place. Such scrutiny, as HEAP's efforts
suggest, pour cold water on the whole concept of "non-lethal" weapons.
The "marketing" appeal of "non-lethal" weapons may be such weapons'
Achilles heel because the "non-lethality" cannot be scientifically demon-
strated with any rigor. In addition, the international legal analysis later in
the Article does not provide any meaningful reason to engage in classi-
fying weapons as "lethal" or "non-lethal."
D. Controversies Surrounding "Non-Lethal" Weapons
The conceptual difficulties presented by the confusing category of
"hion-lethal" weapons play into the various ethical, legal, medical, politi-
cal, and military controversies surrounding them. While "non-lethal"
weapons are being explored and developed in a number of countries,
many questions have been raised about this phenomenon. While the
questions raise different issues, common to these critiques is skepticism
or concern about calling weapons "non-lethal."
Ethically, weapons evaluation focuses on intent and consequences.
As illustrated above in Part I.C above, the labels "lethal" and "non-
lethal" do not accurately reflect how weapons ought to be examined
from an ethical perspective. 9 Legally, concerns have been raised about
the development and use of "non-lethal" weapons violating various
37. See Kenny, supra note 34.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Coupland, supra note 15.
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principles of international law. ° Much of the rest of this Article digs
more deeply into these legal worries.
Medically, the intended and unintended health consequences of
"non-lethal" weapons are not yet well understood,4' making some in the
medical community wary about the attractiveness of "non-lethal" weap-
ons.4 2 Politically, some have expressed opposition to "non-lethal"
weapons because the concept deludes the public and politicians about
the horrible nature of all armed conflict,43 feeds off the need of the post-
Cold War military-industrial complex to create new areas for military
spending,44 and reinforces the government's claims for secrecy and clas-
sified weapons development.5
Militarily, the emergence of "non-lethal" weapons has sent experts
back to military theory, as illustrated by one paper framing its analysis
of "non-lethal" weapons with conflicting principles from Carl von
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.46 More practically, fears have been raised that
the concept of "non-lethal" weapons promises kinder, gentler warfare
that it cannot deliver.47 The military utility of many of the newer "non-
lethal" weapon technologies has been questioned by some military
40. See, e.g., Loye, supra note 11; Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, "Non-Lethal" Weapons
May Violate Treaties, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 44; Theresa Hitchins,
DoD Nonlethal Effort Fuels Fear of Treaty Violations, DEFENSE NEWS, Sept. 26, 1994, at 3,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.
41. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
42. See Coupland, supra note 15, at 72 (arguing that the medical profession should not
be seduced by the term "non-lethal").
43. See Eliot A. Cohen, The Mystique of U.S. Air Power, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 1994, at
109, 121 ("All forms of military power seem likely to benefit from the imminent arrival of
"non-lethal" or "disabling" technologies, which offer the prospect of war without casualties.
But here, perhaps, lies the most dangerous legacy of the Persian Gulf War: the fantasy of
near-bloodless uses of force.").
44. See Powell, supra note 8, at 29 (noting that in 1999 the Department of Defense allo-
cated $99 million for "non-lethal" weapons programs).
45. See DANDO, A NEW FORM, supra note 5, at 25-26 (noting controversy about secrecy
of U.S. "non-lethal" weapons research); Steven Aftergood, The Soft-Kill Fallacy, BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 40 (noting how "non-lethal" weapons programs in
the United States are obscured in secrecy and arguing that the government secrecy system is
"a godsend for non-lethal weapons programs.").
46. See Gregory P. Cook, Waging Peace: The Non-Lethal Application of Aerospace
Power (visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/cook.htm>. Cook contrasts
Clausewitz's argument that "'kind-hearted people might of course think there was some in-
genious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine
this is the true goal of the art of war"' with Sun Tzu's belief that "'those skilled in war subdue
the enemy's army without battle."'
47. See Ian V. Hogg, A World of Insecurity Remains, JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, Nov.
12, 1994, at 33, available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (arguing that "non-lethal
weapon advocates ... want to reduce warfare to a sanitized, noiseless, smokeless, danger-less
activity that will satisfy their competitive urges without hurting anybody or damaging the
environment. History is against them.").
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experts, and some of the technologies have been rejected as unviable. 8
Further, some military experts are concerned that the use of "non-lethal"
weapons might place military forces and civilians in greater danger,
leading to more bloodshed and an escalation of hostilities.4 ' Finally,
some in the military worry that civilian leaders might order military op-
erations more frequently if they believe "non-lethal" weapons provide a
way to complete the mission without the dreaded "CNN effect" under-
mining political resolve at home for military action abroad.0
These different controversies all focus critical attention on the con-
cept of "non-lethal" weapons. The various ethical, legal, medical,
military, and political concerns reinforce doubts about the wisdom of
thinking in terms of "non-lethal" weapons. These worries represent
warnings that the concept of "non-lethal" weapons is not only mislead-
ing but perhaps dangerous within a wide variety of perspectives on
armed conflict.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND "NON-LETHAL" WEAPONS
A. The Concept of "Non-Lethal" Weapons and International Law
International law has for a long time contained rules that applied to
the development and use of weapons, such as the duty not to use weap-
ons that inflict superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Geneva
Protocol I specifically contains a provision on new weapons:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new
weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Proto-
col or by any other rule of international law applicable to the
High Contracting Party."
48. See Scott Gourley, Non-Lethal Weapons-Measure for Measure, JANE'S DEFENCE
WEEKLY, June 24, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File; Nick Lewer,
Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project Research Report Number One, (Nov. 1997)
<http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/cenderal.html> (visited Aug. 11, 1999)(noting that "[m]any
military analysts do not envisage their widespread utility in war").
49. See Lewer, supra note 48 (noting that among the problems with "non-lethal" weap-
ons raised in military journals is "that their availability may increase the likelihood of early
intervention and then escalation; [and] that troops armed with NLWs will be in danger from
ruthless opponents").
50. See Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, supra note 10 (noting "concerns regard-
ing dangers of lowering the threshold of intervention" in connection with "non-lethal"
weapons).
51. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 26, art. 36, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21.
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In no prior case of a new weapon have States and international legal
experts classified a weapon according to its lethality. The concept of
"non-lethal" weapons contains a perspective on weapons that is alien to
traditional international law. This concept raises the question whether
the traditional approach to weapons under international law needs re-
vising in light of this new category of weapons.
The analysis in Part I above illustrated that enough problems exist
with the concept of "non-lethal" weapons to be skeptical of special
treatment for these weapons under international law. The attractiveness
of the concept of weapons that are less lethal might seduce us not to take
international legal analysis of them as seriously as with more traditional
weapons. Part II of this Article is designed to prevent this kind of seduc-
tion from occurring by analyzing in detail the significant number of
issues and questions the concept of "non-lethal" weapons raises for in-
ternational law.
Before beginning that analysis, it is also instructive to consider the
international legal situation if we truly had weapons that caused zero
mortality with genuine temporary incapacitation. The existence of real
"non-lethal" weapons might seem to revolutionize how we look at them
and their use under international law. The answer to the question
whether the use of true "non-lethal" weapons as a method of warfare
conformed to international law might seem to be an easy affirmative be-
cause we envisage more humane warfare if such weapons actually
existed. Closer reflection on this question should give us pause that the
answer is not so easy.
The existence of true "non-lethal" weapons would not alter the way
military forces approach their objectives. It is unlikely that military
commanders would equip their forces only with "non-lethal" weapons."
As noted earlier, use of truly "non-lethal" weapons may actually in-
crease the effectiveness and lethality of traditional weapons during
armed conflict.53 While it is impossible to analyze the possible synergies
between "lethal" and "non-lethal" weapons in the abstract, it would be
reckless to assume that the possession and use of true "non-lethal"
weapons would make warfare more humane. The possession and use of
true "non-lethal" weapons would do little to cut through the "fog of
war". In some respects, "non-lethal" weapons would make the fog
52. See James C. Duncan, A Primer on the Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, 45 NA-
VAL L. REV. 1, 37 (1998)("The Department of Defense has consistently viewed the use of
non-lethal weapons as a means of enhancing the military effectiveness of lethal weapons
systems."); Laura Spinney, A Fate Worse than Death, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 18, 1997, at 26
(noting position of U.S. Marine Corps that "non-lethal" weapons "will only be used to com-
plement lethal weapons, not as a substitute").
53. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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thicker. Will a soldier under fire hesitate to attack persons incapacitated
by "non-lethal" weapons but who he fears may still pose some danger to
himself and his fellow troops? True "non-lethal" weapons might create a
battlefield category between combatant and combatant hors de combat
that would present difficult military and legal questions (see also Part
II.D.2 below).
B. "Non-Lethal" Weapons and Arms Control Regimes
One of the first international legal questions that arises in connection
with "non-lethal" weapons is whether their development violates rele-
vant arms control regimes found in international treaties. 4 These arms
control regimes may prohibit the development of whole categories of
"non-lethal" weapons.
1. Conventional Weapons
In 1981, States adopted the UN Conventional Weapons Convention55
and three Protocols16 that prohibit or restrict the use of specific conven-
tional weapons. In 1995, a fourth Protocol was added to this arms
control regime. The UN Conventional Weapons Convention is based
"on the principle of international law that the right of the parties to an
armed conflict to choose the methods or means of warfare is not unlim-
ited, and on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed
conflicts of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of
a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."58 The four
Protocols prohibit or restrict the following conventional weapons tech-
n6logies: (1) Protocol I prohibits the use of "any weapon the primary
effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body
54. This issue is frequently raised in the literature on "non-lethal" weapons. See, e.g.,
Nick Lewer & Steven Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons for UN Military Operations, INT'L
PEACEKEEPING, Autumn 1997, at 71, 87-90 (analyzing various "non-lethal" weapons in con-
nection with arms control treaties); Committees of the North Atlantic Assembly, Non-Lethal
Weapons, Lord Lyell (United Kingdom) General Rapporteur, Apr. 18, 1997, Doc. No. STC
(97)3 at paras. 38-44 [hereinafter Lyell Report] (analyzing "non-lethal" weapons and arms
control treaties).
55. UN Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 26.
56. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, 19
I.L.M. 1529; Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and
Other Devices, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, 19 I.L.M. 1529; Protocol on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, 19
I.L.M. 1534.
57. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, adopted Oct. 13, 1995, annex, reprinted in
Louise Doswald-Beck, New Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, 312 INT'L REV. RED
CRoss 272, 299 (1996).
58. UN Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 26, preamble, 19 I.L.M. at 1524.
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escape detection by X-rays;"59 (2) Protocol II restricts the use of mines,
booby-traps, and other manually emplaced munitions and devices de-
signed to kill, injure, or damage and that are triggered by remote control
or automatically after passage of a period of time; 4 (3) Protocol III pro-
hibits making civilian populations the object of attack by incendiary
weapons;6' and (4) Protocol IV prohibits the use of blinding laser weap-
ons designed to cause permanent blindness. 62 Another conventional arms
control treaty is the 1997 Land Mine Convention,6 3 which prohibits the
use, development, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines.6
These international legal regulations on the development and use of
conventional weapons affect "non-lethal" weapons in various ways.
Specifically, the Protocols under the UN Conventional Weapons Con-
vention on mines and laser weapons relate to the possible use of "non-
6' 6lethal" mines and "dazzler" laser weapons and optical munitions. 6 The
Land Mine Convention is also relevant to the development of "non-
lethal" anti-personnel mines. The definitions in the Protocol (II) on Pro-
hibitions of Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices and the Land Mine Convention catch anti-personnel mines in-
tended only to incapacitate or injure. Protocol (II) makes no distinction
between lethal and "non-lethal" mines, booby-traps, and other devices;
and the Protocol applies to mines, booby-traps, and other devices de-
signed to kill, injure, or incapacitate. 6' The prohibitions in the Land Mine
Convention apply to mines and similar devices "designed to be exploded
by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapaci-
tate, injure or kill one or more persons., 68 The impact of these broad
treaty definitions on "non-lethal" weapons is revealed by the United
59. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, supra note 56, 19 I.L.M. at 529.
60. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other
Devices, supra note 56, art. 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1530.
61. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, supra
note 56, art. 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1535.
62. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 57, art. 1, 312 INT'L REV. RED
CRoss at 299.
63. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, reprinted in 320 INT'L REV.
RED CROss 563 (1997)[hereinafter Land Mine Convention].
64. Id. art. 1, 320 INT'L REV. RED CROss at 565.
65. The U.S. JNLWD is developing, for example, "a non-lethal variant of the Claymore
mine." JNLWD 1998 REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
66. See Duncan, supra note 52, at 19, 19-20 (noting that both dazzling lasers designed to
cause temporary blindness from 12-24 hours and optical munitions designed to blind tempo-
rarily or disorient are "non-lethal" technologies).
67. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices, supra note 56, art. 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1530.
68. Land Mine Convention, supra note 63, art. 2, 320 INT'L REV. RED CROss at 565.
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States' position that the term "to incapacitate" in Protocol (II) does not
apply to "non-lethal" technology that temporarily disables but that does
not cause permanent injury.69 This American position raises important
issues of treaty interpretation that will have to be faced in connection
with "non-lethal" anti-personnel mines.
Protocol (IV) on Blinding Laser Weapons has relevance for the de-
velopment and use of "dazzler" laser weapons and optical munitions.
Dazzler laser weapons and optical munitions use laser or other optical
technology to disorient and temporarily blind opposing military forces.
Protocol (IV) on Blinding Laser Weapons prohibits the use of "laser
weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of
their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vi-
sion, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight
devices." 70 This prohibition does not cover what the Protocol calls
"legitimate military employment of laser systems," 7' such as discriminate
targeting and range-finding. Accidental or incidental eye injuries may
occur through the use of legitimate laser systems, but they are not
banned by Protocol (IV) on Blinding Laser Weapons.
Dazzler laser weapons and optical munitions pose, however, more
problems than legitimate laser systems because these weapons are de-
signed to operate directly against the human eye for military purposes.
While dazzler laser weapons and optical munitions are not specifically
designed to cause permanent blindness, they could be designed to cause
such blindness as one of their combat functions. If a dazzler laser
weapon or optical munition is adjustable, for example, then on higher
settings they could cause permanent injury to the human eye. Such an
adjustable weapon would be designed to cause serious eye injuries or
even permanent blindness as one of its combat functions, which would
bring it within the scope of the Protocol (IV) on Blinding Laser Weapons.
More generally, the international legal principles on which the UN
Conventional Weapons Convention is based affect the development and
use of other "non-lethal" technologies. Concern has been raised about
69. See Marian Nash Leigh, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to In-
ternational Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 325, 332 (1997)(noting that, in connection with the
Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restric-
tions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, and the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons of the
UN Conventional Weapons Convention, the United States believes that "the term
'incapacitating' does not restrict non-lethal weapon technology that may temporarily disable,
stun or signal the presence of [a] person but not cause permanent incapacity.").
70. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 57, art. 1, 312 INT'L REV. RED
CROss at 299.
71. Id. art. 3.
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the potential effects on human health of anti-personnel weapons that rely
on acoustics, sticky foam, or electromagnetism" and whether these "non-
lethal" weapons should be specifically regulated under international law.
Rosenberg noted interest in 1994 in "the development of specific new
protocols covering electromagnetic weapons., 73 The concern with these
types of potentially harmful "non-lethal" weapons rests on the funda-
mental prohibition on the use of weapons that cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering (see analysis in Part II.D.3 below), but there
may be need to elevate the prohibition from one on use to include the
development and transfer of the weapons as has been done with anti-
74personnel land mines.
2. Biological Weapons
Literature on "non-lethal" weapons frequently mentions the potential
use of biological agents as "non-lethal" weapons.75 Under international
law, the development and use of biological weapons is prohibited. The
1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of bacteriological methods of
warfare,76 and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohib-
its the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of
biological weapons.77 Neither the Geneva Protocol nor the BWC recog-
nize any distinction concerning the lethality of a potential biological
weapon. The ban is absolute. Nor does it appear that any "non-lethal"
intent behind the use of biological agents that degrade mat6riel changes
the analysis. The United States' implementing legislation for the BWC
clearly places use of biological agents for deterioration of food, water,
equipment, supplies, or any kind of material within the prohibition con-
72. See Loye, supra note 11, at 3 (arguing that "there is an urgent need to study carefully
the potential physical and psychological effects of new technologies such as infrasound, elec-
tromagnetic waves or even sticky foam on humans.").
73. Rosenberg, supra note 40, at 45.
74. See Land Mine Convention, supra note 63, art. l(b), 320 INT'L REV. RED CROss at
565 (prohibiting development and transfer of anti-personnel landmines).
75. See, e.g., DANDO, A NEW FORM, supra note 5, at II (listing biological agents that
degrade materials); Duncan, supra note 52, at 20 (listing biomedical agents designed to inca-
pacitate); Margaret-Anne Coppernoll, The Nonlethal Weapons Debate, 52 NAVAL WAR COLL.
REV. 112, 116 (1999)(listing biological agents in taxonomy of "non-lethal" weapons).
76. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S.
65 [hereinafter 1925 Geneva Protocol].
77. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Feb. 25, 1972, 11
I.L.M. 309.
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tained in the BWC. 78 Similarly, the Lyell Report from a NATO Parlia-
mentary Committee stated that "the use of biological agents to render
fuels inert or destroy materials used in material equipment would not be
permissible under the BWC even if the intent was non-lethal."79 Thus,
international law bars the development of "non-lethal" biological weap-
ons.
3. Chemical Weapons
The prohibitions on the development and use of chemical weapons
is also relevant in connection with "non-lethal" weapons. Some of the
"non-lethal" weapons technologies rely on chemical agents to either in-
capacitate people (e.g., calmative weapons) or control space (e.g., sticky
foam). The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical weap-
ons, o and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits the
use, development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of
chemical weapons."' The CWC also regulates the use of riot control
82agents (RCAs), such as tear gas.
The analysis of "non-lethal" weapons under the chemical weapons
regime is more complicated than under the bioweapons regime. Chemi-
cal weapons are defined as "toxic chemicals and their precursors, except
where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention:" 3
peaceful purposes, protective purposes, military purposes not relying on
the toxic properties of the chemicals, and law enforcement purposes. A
"toxic chemical" is defined as "[a]ny chemical which through its chemi-
cal action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or
permanent harm to humans or animals. '85 A "non-lethal" chemical
weapon designed to incapacitate enemy troops is, thus, prohibited by the
CWC.
The CWC does not, however, seem at first glance to cover anti-
mat6riel chemical weapons because the toxic effects of the chemicals are
not being used against humans or animals. This is, however, a misreading
78. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. §§ 175 (prohibitions),
178 (definition of biological agent)(1994). See also Coppernoll, supra note 75, at 122 (noting
that "[b]iological weapons, both antipersonnel and antimaterial, violate U.S. domestic law.").
79. Lyell Report, supra note 54, para. 39.
80. 1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note 76.
81. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, Sen. Treaty Doc. 103-21, 32
I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter CWC].
82. Id. art. 1(5), 32 I.L.M. at 804 ("Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control
agents as a method of warfare.").
83. Id. art. 11(1), 32 I.L.M. at 804-05.
84. Id. art. 11(9), 32 I.L.M. at 805-06.
85. Id. art. 11(2), 32 I.L.M. at 805.
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of the CWC. An anti-mat6riel chemical weapon is covered if the toxic
chemicals used to erode or degrade matdriel "can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals."86 The effect of
the chemical weapon, not the intent behind its use, is the critical analyti-
cal element. This interpretation of the CWC is important to the entire
arms control regime because without it a military force could excuse
human casualties from the use of anti-mat6riel chemical weapons
through the intent argument. In other words, the argument would be that
collateral human injury from an anti-matdriel chemical weapon is ac-
ceptable under international law. Such an interpretation of the CWC
would undermine its object and purpose. This proper interpretation of
the CWC does not entirely prohibit the use of anti-matdriel chemical
weapons, as they could perhaps be used in very specific contexts (e.g.,
covert actions by special forces) where the toxic chemicals do not affect
humans or animals in degrading matdriel. The important point is that the
CWC drastically narrows the potential tactical and strategic scope for
anti-mat6riel "non-lethal" chemical weapons.
The CWC also regulates the use of RCAs. A RCA is "[a]ny chemi-
cal not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans
sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a
short time following termination of exposure."87 This definition makes
non-lethality a pre-condition of a chemical agent being considered a
RCA. Interestingly, the CWC prohibits using this "non-lethal" technol-
ogy as a "method of warfare."88 "Non-lethal" chemical weapons in the
form of RCAs are, thus, banned from the battlefield.
Problems arise, however, in defining "method of warfare." The
CWC contains no definition of this term; and its applicability to military
operations other than war, such as peacekeeping, raises issues about the
legitimate use of RCAs in these operations. The position of the United
States is that RCAs may be used in numerous types of military-related
activities (e.g., peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster relief opera-
tions, counter-terrorist operations, hostage rescue missions, and civilian
rescue missions) conducted outside international or non-international
armed conflicts.89 This position, of course, ties into one of the powerful
86. Id.
87. Id. art. H(7), 32 I.L.M. at 805.
88. Id. art. 1(5), 32 I.L.M. at 804.
89. See Message to the Senate on the Impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on
the Use of Riot Control Agents, 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1337, June 23, 1994, (stating
that "[o]ther peacetime uses of RCAs, such as normal peacekeeping operations, law enforce-
ment operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, counter-terrorist and hostage
rescue operations, and noncombatant rescue operations conducted outside such [international
and non-international armed] conflicts are unaffected by the Convention").
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motivating forces behind the development of "non-lethal" weapons: the
changing role of military forces. The United States also maintains that it
may use RCAs in international and non-international armed conflicts
defensively to save lives (e.g., in search and rescue missions and in cases
where civilians are being used as human shields against military at-
tack).90 This position clearly attempts to preserve for American military
forces the ability to use RCAs as a method of warfare.
In essence, the United States is keeping open the option to use "non-
lethal" chemical weapons in the form of RCAs on the battlefield and in
military operations other than war. Other States have taken a different
view and have expressed their concerns that RCAs would present a dan-
gerous risk "if they were allowed to develop into a new generation of
non-lethal but effective chemical agents of warfare, causing insurmount-
able problems in trying to distinguish between 'real' and 'non-lethal'
chemical weapons on the battlefield, as well as between 'real' and 'non-
lethal' chemical warfare units."'" This tension over RCAs was resolved
in the CWC negotiations by not defining RCAs as chemical weapons but
by subjecting them to the prohibition on their use as a weapon of war-
fare.
A toxic chemical that does not satisfy the criteria in the definition of
RCA is a chemical weapon under the CWC and is prohibited from de-
velopment unless it is developed for a purpose not prohibited under the
CWC. The two most relevant purposes not prohibited are (1) for military
purposes that do not depend on the toxicity of the chemical as the
method of warfare to cause the intended effect;92 and (2) law enforce-
ment purposes, including domestic riot control.93 Sticky foam would be
an example of a "non-lethal" weapon that contains toxic chemicals but
that does not depend on the toxicity of the chemicals to achieve its mili-
tary purpose.
Chemical weapons that do rely on their toxic effects on humans may
be used for law enforcement purposes. This exception clearly brings
RCAs to mind, but the term "law enforcement" is not defined in the
90. In 1975, the President issued Executive Order 11850 that allowed the use of RCAs in
defensive operations during armed conflict. Exec. Order No. 11850, 40 FED. REG. 16187
(1975), reprinted in 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 350 (Apr. 8, 1975). In giving its advice
and consent to the ratification of the CWC, the Senate insisted that Executive Order 11850
remain effective. 143 Cong. Rec. S3378 (Apr. 17, 1997)(stating that the "President shall take
no measure, and prescribe no rule or regulation, which would alter or eliminate Executive
Order 11850 of April 8, 1975.").
91. Chemical Weapons Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-21): Hearings Before the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, 103d Cong. 36 (1994).
92. CWC, supra note 81, art. II(9)(c), Sen. Treaty Doc. 103 at 284.
93. Id. art. l(9)(d).
Fall11999]
Michigan Journal of International Law
CWC and may encompass more activities than riot control. While inter-
pretive controversy exists whether RCAs are chemical weapons within
the meaning of the CWC, one way to look at RCAs is that they can be
used for law enforcement purposes but not as a method of warfare. The
problem with this approach is that it raises the question whether "law
enforcement purposes" includes activities undertaken during military
operations other than war. The CWC does not expressly prohibit the use
of RCAs for extraterritorial peacekeeping activities as the phrase
"including domestic riot control" is not exhaustive of "law enforcement
purposes."9
The United States' position that use of RCAs in military operations
other than war is permissible under the CWC also means that the United
States believes that RCAs can be used for extraterritorial "law enforce-
ment purposes" in activities such as peacekeeping. 9 These positions
essentially mean that the United States believes that "non-lethal" chemi-
cal weapons/RCAs can be used legitimately in military operations other
than war. Not everyone agrees that this position conforms with interna-
tional law. The Lyell Report concluded that the use of incapacitating
chemical weapons "by military forces, even operating in peacekeeping
missions abroad, would be a violation of the CWC. '9 6 This interpretive
controversy will be influenced by the subsequent practice of States.97
Another concern is the potential development of chemical weapons
that are not RCAs for "law enforcement purposes." Such weapons would
not be able to satisfy the RCA criteria because their "non-lethal" effects
on humans might be longer-lasting that the temporary incapacitation re-
quired for RCAs. While more potent than RCAs, the exemption for "law
enforcement purposes" creates the possibility that these more powerful
"non-lethal" chemical weapons could be developed and used. The ap-
propriateness of allowing chemical weapons more powerful than RCAs
to be used for "law enforcement purposes" is questionable both under
domestic law and international law. Domestically, it creates the anomaly
that more powerful chemical weapons may be used against one's own
citizens than against enemy forces because weaker RCAs may not be
used as a method of warfare and the stronger "law enforcement" chemi-
cal weapons could not be used in armed conflict either. Internationally,
could these stronger chemical weapons be deployed in military
94. Id.
95. See note 89 supra.
96. Lyell Report, supra note 54, para. 40.
97. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (noting that in interpreting a treaty States shall take into account "any sub-
sequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation").
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operations other than war under the "law enforcement" exception in
situations that involve activities other than riot control?
The overall impact of the CWC on "non-lethal" chemical weapons is
significant. The least controversial "non-lethal" weapons in the chemical
category are those weapons that contain toxic chemicals but do not rely
on their toxicity to achieve the military purpose, such as sticky foam.
But even sticky foam can be lethal in certain situations because it can
asphyxiate people if it covers their mouth and nose. Use of "non-lethal"
anti-mat6riel chemical weapons is prohibited unless (1) the toxic chemi-
cals in question have no effect on human or animal health, or (2) the
toxic chemicals are used in specific situations where human or animal
health is not in danger. The treatment of RCAs remains controversial.
While State practice may clarify the meaning of important CWC provi-
sions, the fact that something as old and widely used as tear gas has been
embroiled in interpretive disputes is instructive about the perceived dan-
gers of "non-lethal" chemical weapons. Problems remain too with
interpretations of key terms such as "method of warfare" in connection
with RCAs and "law enforcement purposes" for chemical weapons.
4. Summary on Arms Control Regimes
The conventional, biological, and chemical arms control regimes se-
verely limit the potential use of "non-lethal" weapons. This limitation
further reinforces the problems noted with the concept of "non-lethal"
weapons earlier in the Article. Calling weapons "non-lethal" does not
render them susceptible to a lower standard of international legal scru-
tiny in connection with arms control regimes.
However, some important potential "non-lethal" weapons technolo-
gies, such as acoustic and electromagnetic weapons, are not affected by
the existing arms control disciplines because they do not fall into any of
the current treaties on conventional, biological, and chemical weapons.
While relevant principles can be extracted from the conventional weap-
ons regime that can be applied to acoustic and electromagnetic weapons,
such application is not required under any existing treaty. At present,
international legal analysis of the use of these weapons will primarily
fall under principles of customary international law, such as the duty not
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
C. "Non-Lethal" Weapons and International Law on the Use of Force
An important international legal question to ask in connection with
the potential development and use of "non-lethal" weapons is whether
the availability of such weapons would affect international law on the
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use of force. The question may at first glance seem highly speculative
given the infancy of the "non-lethal" weapons movement. The question
is speculative, but it nevertheless deserves exploration because techno-
logical developments can influence how States perceive the use of force
as an instrument of national policy. The effectiveness of cruise missiles
and smart weapons, along with other technological advances in war-
fighting capabilities, may play a role in the recent willingness of the
United States and other countries to use force not in self-defense and
without authorization from the U.N. Security Council. Some perceive in
American actions in Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo a
concerted attempt to loosen the traditional strictures of the international
legal prohibition on the use of force by States contained in the United
Nations Charter.98 What, if anything, does the development of "non-
lethal" weapons portend for international law on the use for force by
States?
1. The Prohibition on the Use of Force and the Use of
Force in Self-Defense
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force
by States against the territorial integrity and political independence of
other States. 9 Force may only be lawfully used in self-defense in re-
sponse to an armed attack' ° or in connection with military operations
authorized by the U.N. Security Council.' These international legal
rules on the use of force are considered fundamental and controversial.
The controversies arise in connection with uses of force that are not self-
defense or actions authorized by the U.N. Security Council. The broad
prohibition on the use of force and the narrow exception of self-defense
in the United Nations Charter does not accurately reflect State practice
in the post-World War II era.'0 2 Some of this State practice concerns the
98. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman & Michael Byers, Has US Power Destroyed the UN?,
21 LONDON REV. BOOKS, April 29, 1999 (visited Apr. 27, 1999) <http://www.lrb.co.uk/
v21/n09/ches2lO9.htm> (arguing that the "US ... now sees itself as having little need for the
UN and international law.").
99. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
100. See id. art. 51.
101. See id. arts. 39, 42.
102. The nature of State practice in connection with the international legal prohibition
on the use of force became a controversial issue in the Nicaragua v. United States case before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In evaluating whether State practice supported the ban
on the use of force as a matter of customary international law, the ICJ held that State practice
involving uses of force did not undermine the prohibition. See Military and Paramilitary in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. U.S.],
para. 186. Numerous international legal commentators took the ICJ to task for how it handled
the relevant State practice on the use of force. See, e.g., Thomas Frank, Some Observations on
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controversial area of humanitarian intervention (see analysis below), but
much of it simply diverges from the rules on the use of force in the
United Nations Charter.
The relevant question for my analysis is how the development and
use of "non-lethal" weapons may affect the international legal rules on
the use of force. Given States' historically demonstrated willingness to
bend and break the rules on the use of force, how would the availability
of "non-lethal" weapons technology play into this long-standing dy-
namic? The first observation to make is that analysis of this question is
premised on the successful development by States of militarily useful
"non-lethal" weapons. I do not assume that the prohibitions and limita-
tions on certain "non-lethal" weapons imposed by the arms control
regimes analyzed earlier will be totally effective. In addition, the devel-
opment and use of some "non-lethal" technologies is not affected by the
conventional, biological, and chemical arms control regimes.
The second observation is that the development of new weapons
technologies has historically played into the willingness of States to use
force as an instrument of national policy. The dynamics of arms races
illustrate this point. States have engaged in extensive and expensive ef-
forts to develop competitive advantages in military weaponry and
technology or at least not to fall too far behind the military technologies
of a likely adversary. Technological inferiority in weapons produces
military and political vulnerability and opportunities for enemies to
shape the future on terms of their making. Threats of force are more real,
and actual uses of force more dangerous, to a State without parity in
military technologies.
It may, at first, seem strange that one could apply the traditional dy-
namics of weapon development to "non-lethal" weapons. After all, I
doubt that any military commander is quaking in his boots about being
attacked by an army equipped only with sticky foam.
The traditional dynamics of weapons development are, however,
relevant because some "non-lethal" weapons may develop capabilities
that make using force more rather than less attractive to States. Particu-
larly important in this regard are potentially powerful "non-lethal" anti-
matdriel weapons. A "rogue" State possessing effective "non-lethal"
anti-matdriel weapons may find tempting the strategy of crippling an
the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 116, 119 (1987)('The
customary norms cited by the Court are adhered to, at best, only by some states, in some in-
stances, and have been ignored, alas, with impunity in at least two hundred instances of
military conflict since the end of World War ll."); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 110 (1989)(arguing that the ICJ's reference to
State practice in Nicaragua "was more in the nature of a verbal protestation than a serious
inquiry into the presence of the necessary elements of customary international law.").
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adversary's military forces through "non-lethal" means in order to ren-
der the adversary more vulnerable to lethal force. The military and
political advantage produced by "non-lethal" anti-matdriel weapons
could then be pressed through diplomacy or military means. The fear
that certain "non-lethal" weapons technologies will fall into unfriendly
hands is one reason why the American "non-lethal" weapons program is
shrouded in secrecy.103
The incentives can also be flipped. A status quo State having trouble
containing the ambition of a "rogue" State may feel tempted to inca-
pacitate the "rogue" State's military machine pre-emptively through
"non-lethal" anti-matdriel weapons. After such an incapacitation, the
status quo State has the upper hand militarily and perhaps politically.
The development and use of "non-lethal" weapons may also give
rise to new kinds of low-intensity conflict between States and within
States. "Non-lethal" weapons may be attractive tools for the conduct
diplomacy by other means in connection with, for example, border dis-
putes or disputes over the control of economic or natural resources. In
addition, "non-lethal" weapons would provide States and non-State ac-
tors, such as rebel or terrorist groups, with new ways to conduct
insurgency/terrorist or counter-insurgency/counter-terrorist operations
(see Part II.E.2 below). "Information warfare" or "cyber warfare" are
possibilities that have military experts and civilian political leaders par-
ticularly worried.' 4
These observations suggest that the development of "non-lethal"
weapons would create environments where the use of force would be
more, not less, likely. Given that it is unlikely that "non-lethal" weapons
will be used exclusively in any conflict, the potential exists for "lethal"
and "non-lethal" force being used. Such possibilities clearly would put
greater pressure on the international legal rules regulating the use of
force.
The development of "non-lethal" weapons also creates some inter-
esting international legal questions for the interpretation of existing
rules. For example, is the first use of a "non-lethal" weapon a use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State?
Although the international legal rules on the use of force developed with
the assumption of lethal force as the target of regulation, there is no legal
or political sense to seeing "non-lethal" force as outside the prohibition
103. See sources cited in note 45 supra.
104. See, e.g., Lyell Report, supra note 54, at paras. 4-20 (analyzing threat of informa-
tion warfare). For legal analysis of information warfare, see Roger D. Scott, Legal Aspects of
Information Warfare: Military Disruption of Telecommunications, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 57
(1998).
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on the use of force by the States. But, given that the States have repeat-
edly through their actions attempted to narrow the scope of the
prohibition on the use of force and expand the scope of the right to self-
defense, arguments that "non-lethal" force is not force as intended by
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter would be entirely predictable.
The development of "non-lethal" weapons also raises questions in
connection with the right of self-defense. First, would the possession of
"non-lethal" weapons encourage States to engage in anticipatory self-
defense more frequently? Whether anticipatory self-defense is legiti-
mate under international law has been controversial. 5 "Non-lethal"
weapons might provide a capability that could be used to frustrate the
military intentions of an adversary. As military technology has produced
weapons capable of striking from ever greater distances at ever faster
speeds, anticipatory self-defense becomes a more problematic concept.
Throw "non-lethal" weapons into the mixture and perhaps the threshold
for anticipatory self-defense is lowered. Such a lowering brings closer
the erosion of the distinction between a use of force and an act of self-
defense.
States have a right of self-defense if they are subject to an armed at-
tack.'6 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in Nicaragua v.
United States that there are distinctions in international law between: (1)
an armed attack and a use of force; and (2) a use of force and an inter-
vention. 0 7 Only an armed attack triggers the right of individual and
collective self-defense.' 8 "Non-lethal" weapons provide a way for States
to exploit this international legal interpretation of the right to self-
defense. "Non-lethal" weapons could be used in such a way that the use
is either an intervention or a use of force (both illegal under international
law).. 9 but does not cross the "armed attack" threshold. Because the vic-
tim of the "non-lethal" weapons use has no right to self-defense in the
absence of an armed attack, the State using the "non-lethal" weapon
cannot be subject to a military response by the victim.
The glaring problems with the ICJ's interpretation of the right to
self-defense in the Nicaragua case have been exposed and criticized by
105. See, e.g., HILAIRE McCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT 91-96 (1992)(analyzing anticipatory self-defense).
106. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
107. Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 102, para. 195 (stating that military assistance to reb-
els may be a use of force or an intervention and yet not be an armed attack).
108. See id. (holding that "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons
or logistical or other support" was not an armed attack justifying the use of force in self-
defense).
109. On the illegality of intervention, see U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7), which prohibits inter-
vention in the domestic affairs of other States.
Fall 1999]
Michigan Journal of International Law
international legal writers, "° and the development and possible use of
"non-lethal" weapons underscore these criticisms. But "non-lethal"
weapons pose other questions for the right to self-defense. While a State
subject to a "non-lethal" weapons attack would clearly believe it could
act in self-defense, such a State is subject to the principles of necessity
and proportionality in responding to a "non-lethal" weapons use. The
necessity principle holds that a State may only use force in self-defense
when it is necessary in the sense that it faces an immediate and serious
threat. "' Usually an armed attack satisfies the necessity principle; but the
nature of "non-lethal" weapons causes some concerns in this context.
While the necessity principle would be satisfied by a use of "non-lethal"
and "lethal" force combined, a use of "non-lethal" weapons alone pres-
ents a murkier situation. Would it be necessary to respond with "lethal"
force to a "non-lethal" weapons attack? The answer to this question
would depend on whether the "non-lethal" attack was continuing or
completed and on the scale of the "non-lethal" attack. What is clear is
that "non-lethal" weapons complicate analysis of the necessary principle
in self-defense analysis under international law.
Assuming that a State satisfies the necessary requirement, its re-
sponse to a use of force must be proportional to the original use of force
and the continuing threat of force. "2 "Non-lethal" weapons also compli-
cate this traditional international legal analysis. Would it be proportional
to respond with "lethal" force to an attack that involved only "non-
lethal" weapons? Again, the actual context would be important in con-
ducting a proper analysis; but "non-lethal" weapons would make
proportionality analysis more difficult. A State that cannot respond in
kind to a "non-lethal" weapons attack may feel deterred from escalating
the conflict to the level of "lethal" force. "Non-lethal" weapons would in
such a situation give the aggressor an advantage because the onus to
move to "lethal" force is on the victim. States would not envy being in
that position, which would fuel the development of defensive measures
110. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Louis HENKIN ET
AL., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 49 (1991)(arguing
that the ICJ "did not address the victim's right of armed response to 'less than an armed at-
tack,' or what means other than force can be used in response to such interventions by either
the victim or its friends").
11. The necessity principle was famously stated in The Caroline Case: self-defense is
permissible when the "necessity of that self-defense [is] instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The Caroline Case, in DAVID J. HAR-
RIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 895 (5th ed. 1998).
112. See McCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 105, at 98 (noting the importance of the
principle of proportionality in the international law on self-defense).
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or offensive "non-lethal" capabilities. The "non-lethal" arms race would
be underway.
2. The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations and
Humanitarian Interventions
Another context in which force may legitimately be used is under
U.N. Security Council authorization in connection with conflicts that
threaten international peace and security. "3 Since the end of the Cold
War, the U.N. Security Council has authorized the use of military force
in a number of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations."'4 In addition,
various regional international organizations have used force in response
to civil wars and ethnic cleansing. "5 Many difficult questions arise in
connection with the applicability of international law to these
peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions. This section focuses on
the potential impact of "non-lethal" weapons on the decision whether to
engage in peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention. A later section
looks at the use of "non-lethal" weapons in peacekeeping and humani-
tarian operations (see Part II.D.8 below).
The question for decision makers contemplating using force in con-
nection with a peacekeeping operation or humanitarian intervention is
whether the availability of "non-lethal" weapons makes an affirmative
decision more rather than less likely. "Non-lethal" weapons have been
deployed and used in the United Nations humanitarian and peace build-
ing operation in Somalia"6 and United Nations and NATO peacekeeping
in Bosnia,"7 but the availability of the weapons deployed cannot be said
to have factored in the decisions to intervene. Assuming that "non-
lethal" weapons continue to be developed and deployed, will their
growing presence in military forces and their "non-lethal" capabilities
factor into the decision whether to intervene militarily? Much, of
course, depends on what "non-lethal" weapons are available and what
type of effectiveness such weapons can achieve. In addition, the nature
113. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 42.
114. See DANDO, A NEW FoRm, supra note 5, at 3 (listing twenty-one UN peacekeeping
missions initiated between 1988 and 1994).
115. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened, for ex-
ample, militarily in Sierre Leone in 1997. See Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The
Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Inter-
vention in Sierre Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321 (1998). NATO has intervened
militarily in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts.
116. See Lewer & Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons for UN Military Operations, supra
note 54, at 79-80 (discussing use of "non-lethal" weapons in Somalia).
117. See U.S. Sends Non-Lethal Riot Gear to Bosnia, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Sept. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, News File (reporting on use of "non-lethal" weapons by
American troops in Bosnia).
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of the conflict into which troops are to be inserted would remain a cen-
tral consideration. Nevertheless, successful development and
deployment of effective "non-lethal" weapons may create incentives for
more military interventions by States, military alliances, such as NATO,
or the United Nations.'1
Given the painful experiences of recent peacekeeping, peacebuild-
ing, and humanitarian operations, it seems unlikely that the continued
development of "non-lethal" weapons would increase the appetite of
international and regional organizations for such military interventions.
In fact, the development of "non-lethal" weapons may increase the re-
luctance of such organizations and their constituent States to commit
troops to military operations other than war. NATO reluctance to com-
mit ground troops to the Kosovo conflict stemed in part from a faith in
air power augmented by sophisticated technology. Some believe that
smart weapons technology has produced in civilian populations in de-
veloped countries a belief in the possibility of "surgical" warfare with
few civilian casualties in the target country and little danger to the at-
tacking military forces.' 9 The success of the NATO air campaign in the
Kosovo conflict has reinforced the special place of air power in Ameri-
can and NATO military thinking. Perhaps "non-lethal" weapons will
feed this phenomenon by encouraging people to develop even more un-
realistic ideas about modem warfare. 2° ...I.
D. "Non-Lethal" Weapons and International Humanitarian Law
"Non-lethal" weapons also have implications for international hu-
manitarian law (IHL), which regulates how force and weapons are used
during armed conflict. IHL is complex area of international law, and my
analysis of "non-lethal" weapons and IHL is not exhaustive. My objec-
tive is to raise some important questions that "non-lethal" weapons pose
for IHL.
118. See, e.g., Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, supra note 10 (arguing that de-
velopment of "non-lethal" weapons raises "concerns regarding the danger of lowering the
threshold of intervention by the international community into the affairs of other nation
states.").
119. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 43, at 109 (analyzing the "mystique" of American air
power in the wake of the Persian Gulf War).
120. See id. (arguing that the combination of air power and "non-lethal" weapons "may
offer an even more appealing prospect: war without casualties.").
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1. Prohibition on Attacking Civilians and Civilian Targets
IHL contains a general prohibition on military forces attacking ci-
vilians and civilian targets. 2' This prohibition has been massively
violated in the wars of the twentieth century. Developments in weapons
technology, especially aircraft, made civilian populations increasingly
vulnerable to military attack. Civilians also suffered terribly when at-
tacked by armies and governments that had no intention of honoring the
laws of war. But civilians also face threats from forces committed to IHL
because civilian fatalities are caused by smart weapons. In addition,
military forces often attack or destroy facilities, such as power plants,
that are important to the health and well-being of civilian populations. '
2 2
How might "non-lethal" weapons affect the IHL prohibition on
military attacks on civilians and civilian populations? In some situations,
"non-lethal" weapons pose familiar problems. During the Persian Gulf
War, allied forces used "non-lethal" anti-mat6riel weapons to disrupt the
Iraqi electricity infrastructure.2 2 The ICRC reported that the destruction
and disruption of electricity caused Iraqi civilians great hardships in
forms of disease and other adverse health consequences.'24 Calling a
weapon "non-lethal" does not remove its potential consequences from
scrutiny under IHL.
Equally important is the possibility that the development of "non-
lethal" weapons will encourage military forces to attack civilians and
civilian targets more rather than less. Military forces might perceive that
attacking civilians and civilian targets with "non-lethal" weapons is ac-
ceptable because the intent is to incapacitate or demoralize rather than
kill. In some contexts, incapacitating or demoralizing civilians might
make the use of "lethal" weapons against opposing military forces easier.
121. See, e.g., Geneva Protocol I, supra note 26, art. 51, para. 2 ("The civilian popula-
tion as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.").
122. See id. art. 54, para. 2 ("It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural
areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and sup-
plies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them ... to the civilian
population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive .... ").
123. See Aftergood, supra note 45, at 40 (quoting defense expert William Arkin as criti-
cizing the use of "non-lethal" weapons (carbon-fiber warheads on Tomahawk sea-launched
cruise missiles) against electrical installations because these weapons "devastated a civilian
population that was otherwise largely spared the direct effects of bombing"). Similar weapons
were available to NATO forces in the Kosovo air campaign. See Stephen S. Rosenfeld,
'Turning Off the Lights in Belgrade,' WASH. POST, May 7, 1999, at A39 (reporting on the
U.S. Air Force's unveiling of "a secret 'blackout' bomb that evidently short-circuits the
equipment but does not actually physically destroy it. This is what is meant by threats to 'turn
off the lights in Belgrade.'").
124. See ICRC, Water in Iraq (ICRC Special Brochure, July 1996).
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Using "non-lethal" weapons against civilians might provide a tactical
military advantage in armed conflict. "Non-lethal" weapons would, thus,
encourage the erosion of the JHL prohibition on attacking civilians.
Behind the IHL prohibition is the principle that military forces must
discriminate between military and civilian targets.'9 Important to the
IHL analysis will be whether "non-lethal" weapons can only be, or are
being, used indiscriminately. A "non-lethal" weapon that cannot be used
in a discriminate way would cause IHL concerns. Thus, if an acoustic
weapon intended to incapacitate military forces cannot be used without
also incapacitating civilians, such a "non-lethal" weapon cannot satisfy
IHL. But one can easily see that people wanting to use the "non-lethal"
weapon would argue that its indiscriminate use does not violate IHL be-
cause the intent is not to kill and the civilians are only temporarily
incapacitated. In other words, the indiscriminate use of a "non-lethal"
weapon causes acceptable collateral damage to civilians. Other weapons,
such as bombs, that can be used discriminately cause fatal collateral
damage that is routinely accepted as regrettable but not illegal. It would
be anomalous to accept fatal collateral damage but reject incapacitation
as legitimate collateral damage.
The IHL concern with this line of reasoning is that, with an indis-
criminate weapon, the intent to attack only military forces is hollow; and
the reality is that both military and civilian targets are being attacked
intentionally. Allowing the use of an indiscriminate "non-lethal" weapon
just because civilians are incapacitated but not killed would eat at the
heart of the IIL protections for civilians. Less worrying is civilian col-
lateral damage resulting from the use of a discriminate "non-lethal"
weapon intended for use only against military forces because ample
practice exists in connection with fatal civilian collateral damage result-
ing from discriminate attacks on military forces with conventional
weapons.
2. Prohibitions on Attacking Combatants Who Are Hors de Combat
IHL prohibits military forces from attacking combatants who are
incapacitated or disarmed and no longer present a military threat (hors
de combat).'26 This aspect of IHL is clearly relevant to the use of
125. See Geneva Protocol I, supra note 26, art. 48 ("In order to ensure respect for and
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.").
126. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T. 3114,
3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 ("Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
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"non-lethal" weapons on the battlefield,'2" and "non-lethal" weapons
raise a number of questions in this regard.
First, it is not clear how a soldier will be able to determine in the
heat of the battle whether an enemy combatant is hors de combat as a
result of the use of a "non-lethal" weapon. How much incapacitation is
necessary to render a combatant hors de combat? Just as a soldier
wounded by a "lethal" weapon may still pose a military threat to his en-
emy, an incapacitated soldier may also constitute a threat. Perhaps this
observation suggests that the identification of a combatant hors de com-
bat is difficult regardless whether "lethal" or "non-lethal" weapons are
used, and that "non-lethal" weapons do not complicate this already diffi-
cult task. Much would depend, of course, on the particular physical
effects of a "non-lethal" weapon, so it is difficult to speculate much. But
the easier it is to recognize incapacitation the stronger will be the physi-
cal effect of the "non-lethal" weapon, perhaps raising other questions
under IHL (see Part II.D.3 below).
Second, military forces have duties under IHL to treat combatants
hors de combat humanely, including provision of medial treatment to
wounded or sick combatants. How do these IHL duties relate to the in-
capacitation caused by "non-lethal" weapons? Is a soldier incapacitated
by a "non-lethal" weapon wounded or sick within the meaning of IHL?
Given the humanitarian thrust of IHL, the answer to the last question
would be affirmative, in which case military forces using "non-lethal"
weapons will have to train their troops in how to provide treatment to
incapacitated enemy soldiers. While perhaps not conceptually difficult
for IHL, this conclusion may create practical problems for forces in the
field who will have to be trained to deal with traditional wounds and
"non-lethal" incapacitation.
Third, unlike a traditional wound from a "lethal" weapon, the inca-
pacitation caused by "non-lethal" weapons is assumed to be temporary
in effect. Military forces in the field will face not only the problem of
identifying whether the incapacitated are hors de combat but also the
problem of how to neutralize the incapacitated before the incapacitation
wears off. Military personnel would have to be diverted from the mili-
tary objective to round up, contain, and then move incapacitated
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely...");
Loye, supra note 11, at 4 (staring that IHL "describes a person as being hors de combat when
he or she: ... has been rendered unconscious or been otherwise incapacitated by wound or
sickness, and is therefore incapable of defending him[self] or herself.").
127. See Loye, supra note 11, at 4 (arguing that the concept of hors de combat "is par-
ticularly pertinent with regard to some of the technologies proposed in the context of 'non-
lethal' weapons.").
Fall 19991
Michigan Journal of International Law
combatants out of the battle zone. In the heat of battle, such activities
might not be possible. Military personnel might confront the choice be-
tween attacking the incapacitated or seeing them shake off the effects of
a "non-lethal" weapon and return to the fight. Faced with that choice,
military forces would probably ignore rules protecting enemy combat-
ants rendered hors de combat by a "non-lethal" weapon.
Fourth, IHL protections for combatants hors de combat have not
been widely respected in twentieth century wars. Military forces in all
likelihood will see incapacitation through "non-lethal" weapons as a
means to maximize the impact of "lethal" force. The tactic might be to
hit enemy troops first with "non-lethals" and to follow up this attack
with "lethal" force. This combination tactic might maximize battle im-
pact on the enemy while reducing casualties for the attacking side. As
Loye argued, "[t]he combined use on the battlefield of 'non-lethal' and
conventional weapons may well increase the overall mortality rate from
conventional weapons and violate the rules on persons hors de com-
bat.",128 In this dynamic, the hors de combat principle gets pushed aside
for purposes of military expediency.
3. Prohibitions on Weapons that Cause Superfluous Injury or
Unnecessary Suffering
As seen earlier, another central principle of the IHL is the prohibi-
tion on weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering. 29 This principle has been behind a number of prohibitions of
specific weapons systems, such as exploding bullets, blinding laser
weapons, and anti-personnel land mines (see Part II.B. 1 above). At first
glance, it would seem that "non-lethal" weapons cause no concerns for
this IHL principle because the intended physical effects are assumed to
be temporary. It remains important for the integrity of IHL to apply the
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering principle to "non-lethal"
weapons because the assumption of temporary incapacitation may not be
warranted.
One concern for this principle of IHL is that the health effects of
many potential "non-lethal" weapons are, as mentioned earlier, not
known. The superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering principle should
guide development of "non-lethal" weapons to ensure that the physical
effects of the weapons are not severe or permanent. 30 Potentially very
128. Id.
129. See sources cited in note 74 supra.
130. See Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 26, art. 36 (providing that States Parties are un-
der a duty to ensure that the employment of new weapons do not violate the Protocol or any
other rule of international law).
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helpful in this regard is an objective approach to determining whether a
weapon causes superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering developed by
the ICRC. 3' The ICRC argues that "[t]here has never been an objective
means of determining what constitutes 'superfluous injury or unneces-
sary suffering' . The ICRC proposes to determine what weapons cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering by examining:
design-dependent, foreseeable effects of weapons when they are
used against human beings and cause:
- specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, spe-
cific abnormal psychological state, specific and permanent
disability or specific disfigurement (Criterion 1);
- field mortality of more than 25% or hospital mortality of
more than 5% (Criterion 2);
- Grade 3 wounds [large wounds] as measured by the Red
Cross wound classification system (Criterion 3); or
- effects for which there is no well-recognized and proven
treatment (Criterion 4). 133
The ICRC advocates using this objective approach to analyze all new
weapons, including "non-lethal" weapons.1
3 4
Countervailing pressures will exert themselves against the superflu-
ous injury/unnecessary suffering principle. As mentioned earlier, greater
incapacitation is preferable from a military perspective. The battlefield
utility of a mild incapacitation of enemy troops is questionable. Greater
incapacitation probably requires more significant physiological effects,
perhaps increasing the chances for superfluous injury/unnecessary suf-
fering. Given that chemical and biological "non-lethal" anti-personnel
weapons are prohibited by international law, other "non-lethal" forces,
such as acoustics or electromagnetism, would have to be used. The
short- and long-term health effects of these more exotic "non-lethal"
technologies is not currently well understood.
Another issue for which the superfluous injury/unnecessary suf-
fering principle is relevant concerns the potential adjustability of some
"non-lethal" weapons technologies. Military planners desire rheostatic
or "tunable" weapons that the soldier can adjust between "lethal" and
131. See ICRC, THE SIRUS PROJECT: TOWARDS A DETERMINATION OF WHICH WEAP-
ONS CAUSE "SUPERFLUOUS INJURY OR UNNECESSARY SUFFERING" (Nov. 1997).
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id. at 25.
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"non-lethal" munitions. 135 Some laser, acoustic, microwave, and electro-
magnetic weapons will probably be adjustable, allowing the operator to
increase or decrease the physiological effect of the weapon on the enemy
forces. This adjustability is something new for IHL as the physical effect
of existing weapons cannot be fine-tuned as laser, microwave, acoustic,
and electromagnetic weapons could be. Adjustability is a concern be-
cause, from a military perspective, greater incapacitation of enemy
troops is preferable. Tunable weapons might, therefore, be set at levels
that reflect military expediency rather than humanitarian principles.'36
Finally, the development of "non-lethal" weapons may create IHL
problems for the use of "lethal" weapons. If a military objective can be
achieved by using "non-lethal" weapons, then the use of "lethal" weap-
ons might be thought to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering. 37
4. Regulation of the Treatment of POWs
IHL requires that military forces and governments treat prisoners of
war (POWs) humanely. IHL contains a detailed and comprehensive set
of rules on the treatment of POWs.'38 "Non-lethal" weapons implicate
this area of IHL because the use of these weapons would presumably
produce POWs through incapacitation and capture of enemy soldiers.
Whether the use of "non-lethal" weapons would produce more POWs
than the use of more traditional military weapons is, of course, specula-
tive; but considering the intent behind the use of "non-lethal" weapons,
it seems likely that the number of POWs would increase rather than de-
crease (assuming that armies did not take advantage of incapacitation by
killing more combatants hors de combat).
The generally horrific treatment of POWs in the wars of the twenti-
eth century gives one pause as to whether potentially increasing the
number of POWs through the use of "non-lethal" weapons would be a
135. See, e.g., David Kruczynski, Variable Velocity Individual Weapon, paper presented
at First Annual Non-Lethal Technology and Academic Research Symposium, Quantico, Vir-
ginia (May 3-5, 1999), (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www.unh.edu/orps/
nonlethality/pub/proceedingsl999.html#posters> (describing the variable velocity combustion
light gas gun).
136. See Loye, supra note 11, at 5 ("Experts advocate that this technical possibility
[tunable weapons] will give the soldier more options. But is it not inevitable that under battle-
field conditions the soldier will in most cases choose a high or even the maximum energy
output?... The tunable option will quickly be reduced to one option, the maximum option.").
137. See id. at 4 (asking "if a military objective can be achieved by using 'non-lethal'
weapons, then would not the use of 'non-lethal' weapons in combination with 'lethal' force be
in excess of the anticipated military advantage?").
138. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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humane situation. With rare exceptions, armies and governments have
badly mistreated POWs; and the development and use of "non-lethal"
weapons would have little impact on the reasons for the massive viola-
tion of IHL on treatment of POWs. The knowledge that POW conditions
will probably be very bad would probably motivate soldiers to resist
capture as strenuously as possible. This motivation might make inca-
pacitated soldiers dangerous to the enemy, feeding into the dynamics
described earlier that point towards shooting rather than capturing and
humanely treating victims of "non-lethal" weapons.
IHL on POWs is also relevant to "non-lethal" weapons as such
weapons may be used to contain and control POWs in POW camps. One
fear might be that POWs become subjects in experiments with "non-
lethal" weapons. Armies seeking to "test drive" new "non-lethal" tech-
nologies might be tempted to make POWs laboratory subjects because
the POWs are a captive resource that can be monitored and evaluated in
a controlled environment. Japanese and German armies conducted medi-
cal experiments on POWs during World War II by testing chemical and
biological weapons on them. Medical and scientific experiments on
POWs was prohibited in international law after the Second World
War."' The vulnerability of POWs, and the nature of "non-lethal" weap-
ons, may combine to tempt militaries and governments to experiment on
POWs with new "non-lethal" technologies. Such experimentation would,
of course, be most alarming under IHL.
While the use of "non-lethal" weapons in POW camps might seem
preferable to "lethal" weapons, more problems might in fact be created.
POWs might be emboldened to escape from the camp or challenge
guards if they believe that the primary response would be "non-lethal".
Tensions in the camp may escalate, leading to greater violence on both
sides and more "lethal" uses of force than might have occurred had only
"lethal" weapons been involved from the beginning. Any potential dete-
rioration in the conditions of POWs would be a grave concern for IHL.
5. Regulation of Treatment of Civilians in Occupied Territory
One of the intended uses of "non-lethal" weapons is crowd control,
and such weapons could be useful to an occupying power in controlling
the civilian population. IHL has detailed rules on how civilian popula-
tions in occupied territories are to be treated by the detaining power,"4
and any use of "non-lethal" weapons by a detaining power would have
139. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
138, art. 13, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
140. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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to conform to the IHL rules on occupation. As with other areas of IHL,
the rules on protecting civilians in occupied territories have been mas-
sively violated in twentieth century wars. As with "non-lethal" weapons
in the context of POWs, concerns might arise with the misuse of
"non-lethal" weapons by detaining powers in their control over
occupied civilian populations.
6. Regulation of Environmental Modification During Armed Conflict
IHL also contains rules that attempt to protect the environment from
certain consequences of armed conflict. The State parties to the Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques undertake "not to engage in
military or any other hostile use of environmental modification tech-
niques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party." 4' An
"environmental modification technique" is defined as "any technique for
changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes-
the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota,
lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.' 42 Geneva
Protocol I prohibits "methods or means of warfare which are intended,
or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage
to the natural environment."'
43
Some "non-lethal" weapons, such as defoliants, soil destabilizers,
and weather modification, manipulate parts of the Earth's biota or at-
mosphere to achieve a military purpose and thus could be considered
environmental modification techniques.'" Whether such weapons have
widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects on the environment needs to
be one of the criteria guiding the evaluation of such weapons.
7. Use of "Non-Lethal" Weapons and War Crimes
IHL criminalizes certain behavior during times of armed conflict.' 45
The supposed benign intentions behind "non-lethal" weapons might
make us reluctant to believe that the use of such weapons could ever
141. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, opened for signature May 18, 1977, art. I, para. 1, 1108
U.N.T.S. 151, 153.
142. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, supra 141, art. II, 75 U.N.T.S. at 153.
143. Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 26, art. 35, para. 3, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21.
44. See Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, supra note 10, at § 4 (noting that many
analysts have criticized "non-lethal" weapons as environmentally unsafe).
145. See Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 19, art. 6 (defining
crime of genocide), art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity), art. 8 (defining war crimes).
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result in crimes in IHL. In addition, the physical harm caused by "non-
lethal" weapons is supposed to be temporary, which suggests that
"non-lethal" weapons could not as a general matter inflict the kind of
harm criminalized under IHL. But "non-lethal" weapons may be used in
ways that would constitute or contribute to criminal acts under IHL.
The crime of genocide includes acts such as causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group with the intent to destroy such group. 46 "Non-lethal" weapons
could be used to cause serious bodily or mental harm to members of a
group as part of a strategy to destroy it in whole or in part. Fears have
been raised that the revolution in biotechnology and human genomics
could produce the potential for the development of "genetic weapons"-
weapons designed to target specific racial or ethnic groups. 47 "Non-
lethal" weapons could also be used to facilitate ethnic cleansing, such as
occurred in the former Yugoslavia. Crimes against humanity include
inhumane acts causing great suffering or serious bodily or mental injury
as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian popula-
tion. As with the crime of genocide, it is not inconceivable that
military forces could use "non-lethal" weapons in committing crimes
against humanity.
Similarly, "non-lethal" weapons could be used in the commission of
various war crimes, such as (1) torture or inhuman treatment, including
experiments on the human body; 149 (2) wilfully causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or health;'5° (3) intentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population;' (4) intentionally directing attacks
against civilian objects;5 2 (5) attacking towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings that are undefended and that are not military objectives;'" (6)
killing or wounding a combatant who no longer has means of defense;
5 4
(7) subjecting persons to scientific experiments that endanger the health
146. See id. art. 6.
147. See BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, BIOTECHNOLOGY, WEAPONS AND HUMANITY
66-67 (1999)(noting that genetic weapons may be developed in the future); Ethirajan An-
barasan, Genetic Weapons: A 21st-Century Nightmare?, THE UNESCO COURIER, Mar. 1999,
at 37 (noting warnings of scientists about the possibility of genetic weapons); Gene Warfare-
Unless We Keep Our Guard Up, 348 THE LANCET 1183 (1996).
148. See Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 19, art. 7.
149. See id. art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
150. See id. art. 8(2)(a)(iii).
151. See id. art. 8(2)(b)(i).
152. See id. art. 8(2)(b)(ii).
153. See id. art. 8(2)(b)(v).
154. See id. art. 8(2)(b)(vi).
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of the individual;1 5 and (8) employing weapons that cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate.
Using "non-lethal" weapons does not exculpate military acts from
crimes established under IHL. This conclusion reinforces the point made
repeatedly in this Article: it is the intent behind how a weapon is used
and how a weapon is actually used that determine its treatment under
IHL, not the politically correct name it is given.
8. IHL and Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations by Multinational
Forces
Much of the impetus behind the "non-lethal" weapons movement
has come from the experiences of multinational forces, such as United
Nations forces, during peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. In such
operations, multilateral forces have sensed a need for something other
than "lethal" force in carrying out their missions. The addition of "non-
lethal" weapons to the arsenal of multinational forces might help make
such forces more effective in achieving their military and humanitarian
objectives.17 Considerable difficulty has arisen, however, in the applica-
tion of IHL to multinational forces. Louise Doswald-Beck, the Head of
the Legal Division of the ICRC, noted the difficulty of applying IHL to
United Nations forces and other multinational forces.5 8 She finds the
effort to fit peacekeeping and humanitarian operations into rules of in-
ternational law designed for "belligerents" to be an "insuperable"
problem and calls for a specific international effort on applying IHL in
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations by multinational forces.5 9
This general problem relates to the development and use of "non-
lethal" weapons by multinational forces engaged in peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations. Part II of this Article demonstrates the contin-
ued relevance of a great deal of IHL to the use of "non-lethal" weapons.
But if traditional IHL does not fit multinational peacekeeping and hu-
manitarian operations, then it is difficult to apply IHL disciplines to the
use of "non-lethal" weapons by multinational forces. Any international
effort to clarify the relationship between IHL and peacekeeping and hu-
manitarian operations by multinational forces should include
155. See Statute of International Criminal, supra note 19, art. 8(2)(b)(x).
156. See id. art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
157. See Lewer & Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons for UN Military Operations, supra
note 54 (analyzing deployment of "non-lethal" weapons as part of UN military operations and
arguing that "non-lethal" weapons could contribute to the development of UN benign inter-
vention).
158. Louise Doswald-Beck, Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Fu-
ture Wars, 52 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 24,43 (1999).
159. Id.
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consideration of "non-lethal" weapons given their apparent development
to assist in such operations.
E. Other Areas of International Law
While the international law on the use of force and how force is used
during armed conflict are the most relevant areas in connection with
"non-lethal" weapons, their development and use implicate other areas
of international law as well. In this section, I discuss the relationship
between "non-lethal" weapons and (1) human rights, (2) terrorism, and
(3) environmental protection.
1. Human Rights
While this Article has analyzed "non-lethal" weapons mainly in
connection with their use in armed conflict, such weapons also have do-
mestic applications that might raise human rights concerns. Domestic
law enforcement agencies and forces also have developed serious inter-
est in "non-lethal" technologies to give them more operational flexibility
in protecting the public.' 6 This benign interest in "non-lethal" technolo-
gies may not, however, be universal. International human rights non-
governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, regularly
report on the massive scale of abuses of fundamental human rights by
governments all over the world.' 61 Many older "non-lethal" weapons,
such as tear gas, wooden batons, and rubber bullets, have been long used
by oppressive regimes against their own people.62 It is possible that
newer "non-lethal" weapons will also become part of the arsenal of
authoritarianism that is used to repress dissent and deter political oppo-
sition. News reports indicate that "non-lethal" weapons, such as
electronic stun guns, "taser" weapons, and stun belts "are being made
available to regimes known to use such devices for torture.' 63 Such
"non-lethal" weapons are "popular" with torturers "not only because of
the extreme pain they can inflict, but because they leave very little
physical evidence of their use."' 64 Only the naYve would believe that new
"non-lethal" weapons will remain solely in the hands of the "good guys"
160. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 3.
161. See, e.g., Amnesty International, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (visited Aug. 11, 1999)
<http://www.anesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/index.html> (arguing that for most people in the
world the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human "are little more than a paper
promise.").
162. See, e.g., LEWER & SCHOFIELD, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS, supra note 5, at 97-98
(discussing use of "non-lethal" weapons as instruments of torture).
163. Lewer, supra note 48, at § 4.2; see also, LEWER & SCHOFIELD, NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS, supra note 5, at 97-98.
164. Lewer, supra note 48, at § 4.2.
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and will be used only for saving lives in peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations. Some human rights groups have called for bans on the export
of these "non-lethal" technologies to repressive governments.'65
2. Terrorism
States have used international law to create obligations to fight ter-
rorism and to bring terrorists to justice.' 66 "Non-lethal" weapons provide
opportunities for States in their fight against terrorism, but they also
provide terrorists with new means to attack political, economic, and so-
cial targets. As illustrated by the recent United States' attacks on
Afghanistan and the Sudan in response to the terrorist bombings of the
American embassies in East Africa, the United States is willing to use
force as part of its counter-terrorist policy. "Non-lethal" weapons may
provide the United States and its allies more mission flexibility in strik-
ing at terrorist targets by offering a way to hit terrorist facilities without
creating disturbing collateral damage sometimes caused by conventional
weapons. "Non-lethal" weapons may also provide States with more op-
tions in dealing with terrorist biological or chemical facilities that would
avoid potentially dangerous collateral damage.167 "Non-lethal" weapons
may also have utility in many different kinds of counter-terrorist activi-
ties that involve low-intensity, covert attacks. While many would
welcome the use of "non-lethal" weapons in counter-terrorist activities,
some worry that the United States violates international law in attacking
alleged terrorist bases located in the territory of other States.6 8 "Non-
lethal" weapons may simply reinforce American willingness to ignore
international rules on the use of force in order to strike back at terrorists.
Terrorists, on the other hand, may also find great utility in "non-
lethal" weapons. Such weapons may allow terrorists to disrupt political,
economic, and social activities in new and insidious ways. Terrorists
armed with "non-lethal" weapons might be more dangerous than those
165. See id.
166. The U.S. government is party, for example, to eleven treaties that address vari-
ous aspects of the fight against terrorism. See International Terrorism Conventions,
Aug. 17, 1998 (visited Aug. 11, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/
980817_terrorconv.html>.
167. See John D. Willet, In Situ Defeat of Chemical and Biological Weapons of Mass
Destruction: The Emerging Utility of Non-Lethal Weapons, paper presented at First Annual
Non-Lethal Technology and Academic Research Symposium, Quantico, Virginia
(May 3-5, 1999), (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www.unh.edu/orps/nonlethality/pub/
proceedings I 999.html#posters> (discussing potential utility of "non-lethal" weapons in deal-
ing with terrorist biological or chemical facilities).
168. See Chesterman & Byers, supra note 98 ("It is ... unclear whether the acts of ter-
rorist organisations can give rise to a right to launch armed attacks against the territorial
integrity of another sovereign state.").
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with only conventional weapons because the "non-lethal" weapons give
the terrorists mission flexibility just as such weapons might give military
forces more options in achieving an objective. The dangers of terrorists
possessing new ways to disrupt the status quo are revealed in concerns
about such possibilities as cyber-terrorism. As Bunker has argued,
"[c]yber based non-lethal technology ... [i]n the hands of non-state
(criminal) soldiers/new warmaking entities, ... provides a projected
warfighting capability against which modern society and political or-
ganization (the nation-state) are ultimately defenseless."
3. Environmental Protection
Another area of international law that bears some attention in con-
nection with some "non-lethal" weapons is international environmental
law. For example, a key chemical ingredient of sticky form is Freon-12
(dicholorodifluoromethane), which is on the list of ozone-depleting sub-
stances being phased out by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer.10 United States law implementing the Mont-
real Protocol banned the production and consumption of Freon-12 after
December 31, 1995.'"' This case illustrates that the environmental as-
pects of "non-lethal" weapons also play a role in international legal
evaluation of these weapons.
III. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL APPROACH TO
"NON-LETHAL" WEAPONS
The main theme of Part II of this Article has been that international
legal vigilance across many different areas of international law is re-
quired in connection with the development and use of "non-lethal"
weapons. The feel-good term "non-lethal" masks the extent to which
these weapons create significant concerns for arms control, international
law on the use of force, international humanitarian law, and other areas
of international law. The need to review and scrutinize "non-lethal"
weapons under international law is manifest, and it can never be taken
for granted that the development or use of "non-lethal" weapons are le-
gitimate under international law.
The United States government has implemented a policy that reflects
the importance of vetting "non-lethal" weapons under international law.
The Department of Defense Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons requires
169. Bunker, supra note 25.
170. See Coppernoll, supra note 75, at 120.
171. See id.
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that the development and use of all "non-lethal" weapons be subjected to
a legal review to assess their conformity with domestic and international
law, especially the laws of war.' Coppernoll reported that the Depart-
ment of the Navy Judge Advocate General (Navy JAG) has conducted
several legal reviews of various "non-lethal" weapons, including stinger
grenades, 12-gauge shotgun firing bean bags, rubber pellets, and wood
baton rounds, 40 millimeter foam-rubber pellet, bean bag, and wood
baton rounds, sticky foam, barrier foam, and foam-rubber mortar
round.' Navy JAG has also conducted a preliminary legal review of
certain chemically based "non-lethal" weapons.174
While the United States practice of reviewing the development and
deployment of "non-lethal" weapons is important, the conformity of
"non-lethal" weapons with international law cannot be left solely in the
hands of great military powers. First, it is the United States that is lead-
ing the "non-lethal" weapons movement because its military perceives
utility in these weapons. Thus, the danger exists that interpretations of
international law might be self-serving in order to promote the develop-
ment and deployment of "non-lethal" weapons. Second, American
interpretations of international legal rules do not always represent the
interpretations of the rest of the world. The American position on RCAs
under the CWC is a case in point. The United States clearly maintains
that RCAs may be used during armed conflict in certain situations de-
spite the prohibition on the use of RCAs as a "method of warfare." The
American position on this issue is not shared universally.
There is, thus, a need for other States and non-governmental organi-
zations to take a serious interest in the international legal implications of
"non-lethal" weapons. As more governments get involved in analyzing
these technologies, it will be important for international legal scrutiny to
be high on their list of priorities, as it is in the United States. Similarly,
non-governmental organizations need to be involved in the international
legal scrutiny of "non-lethal" weapons, and the concern and interest of
172. See Department of Defense Directive 3000.3, supra note 32, para. E(6)(b)("Ensure
that a legal review of the acquisition of all non-lethal weapons is conducted. The review
should ensure consistency with the obligations assumed by the U.S. Government under all
applicable treaties, with customary international law, and, in particular, the laws of war.").
173. See Coppernoll, supra note 75, at 118.
174. Coppernoll reported that this preliminary legal review addressed chemically and
biologically based "non-lethal" weapons for both anti-matdriel and anti-personnel purposes.
See Id. She reported that "[o]nly microbes did not receive approval for development; this
category of weapons was held to violate the Biological Weapons Convention." Id.
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the ICRC in this area is one indication of the value of NGO involve-
ment.'75
Drawing on the analysis presented in this Article, I believe the inter-
national legal approach to be applied in evaluating the development and
use of "non-lethal" weapons should combine the following general prin-
ciples:
1. No analytical value can be given to the term or concept of
"non-lethal." Given the current state of these new technolo-
gies, and their likely future development, thinking about
these weapons as "non-lethal" is inaccurate, misleading, and
can lead to assumptions that are not warranted by the facts.
2. International legal analysis of "non-lethal" weapons has to
proceed as it does with the development and use of any new
weapon: what is the technology involved, what are the ca-
pabilities of the technology, what is the intent behind the use
of the technology, what are the specific contexts in which it
will be used, and what are the actual (or foreseeable) effects
of the technology's use?
3. "Non-lethal" weapons often pose novel problems for inter-
national law. While analysis sometimes proceeds to clear
answers (e.g., the illegality of "non-lethal" biological weap-
ons), in other situations the technology envisaged, such as
adjustable force weapons, create situations not previously
addressed by international law. Thus, "non-lethal" weapons
present international lawyers with challenges that will have
to be met with rigor and creativity.
4. While "non-lethal" weapons pose new challenges in some
circumstances, they also replay well-known dynamics in the
area of weapons development and use. The age-old tension
between military necessity and humanitarian principle recurs
in connection with "non-lethal" weapons. Familiarity with
old controversies will help guide analysis with regard to the
evaluation of the new "non-lethal" weapons.
5. Maintaining balance will be important for international law-
yers examining "non-lethal" weapons. New weapons
175. See analyses of two ICRC officials: Coupland, supra note 15 and Loye, supra note
11. The Federation of American Scientists has also been monitoring the emergence of "non-
lethal" weapons technologies and the potential problems they create. See Steven Aftergood,
Monitoring Emerging Military Technologies, F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REP., Jan.-Feb. 1995,
(visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.fas.org/faspir/pir0295.html>.
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developments will occur, so blanket opposition to new
weapons technologies is an unhelpful position. While "non-
lethal" weapons promise results that would hearten any
doctor or international humanitarian lawyer, it would
likewise be a mistake to take such promises at face value."'
The traditional weighing of military necessity and humani-
tarian concerns (e.g., in the principle of proportionality) also
reflects the need for balanced judgements in connection with
examining new weapons technologies.
6. International lawyers have to remember that they depend on
input from many disciplines in evaluating weapons: the
medical profession, scientists, civilian military experts, and
military forces. "Non-lethal" weapons are a good illustration
of how multi-disciplinary weapons evaluation has to be.
Constructive dialogue among these participants will be more
helpful in the long-run than animosity and exclusion.
The international legal approach sketched in the above principles is
general and provides no specific guidance on any particular "non-lethal"
weapon. Each "non-lethal" weapon will have to be approached on a
case-by-case basis. The major point is, however, that international law
be one of the key tools in the development, deployment, and use of
"non-lethal" weapons by military forces.'
CONCLUSION
"Non-lethal" weapons are not the answer to the current crisis faced
by ethical and international legal restraints on war. International law on
armed conflict faces graver threats today than the use of bean bag gre-
nades and sticky foam. "Non-lethal" weapons hold out the promise of a
technological way to reduce the suffering and destruction of war, but the
promise of such a technological approach to humanizing war is more
chimerical than real. The concept of "non-lethal" weapons is itself mis-
leading; the most promising military use of "non-lethal" weapons is in
combination with "lethal" ones; and "non-lethal" weapons may have
malevolent consequences and uses their designers never intended.
176. See Spinney, supra note 52, at 26 (quoting Robin Coupland, an ICRC surgeon, as
saying that "I would embrace anything that produces less death and less injury on the battle-
field. I am not yet convinced that all these ["non-lethal"] technologies will produce that.").
177. See id. (quoting Nick Lewer of the University of Bradford's Non-Lethal Weapons
Research Project as arguing that in controlling "non-lethal" weapons "[y]ou have to fall back
on the laws of war and international humanitarian law.").
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The Head of the Legal Division of the ICRC has argued that one of
the major problems with the implementation of international humanitar-
ian law in the twentieth century has been that the laws of war have
moved from reflecting State practice to preventing such practice.'78 New,
ever more destructive military technologies in the twentieth century
meant that statespersons and international lawyers could no longer let
the laws of war reflect State practice. " ' Quickly the gap between the re-
ality of armed conflict and the laws of war widened to an embarrassing
and depressing abyss. In addition, the development of international hu-
manitarian law produced some strange conclusions: certain bullets were
outlawed but nuclear weapons were not. 8 "Non-lethal" weapons present
the potential for further situations that do not appeal to common sense.
As the Council of Foreign Relations argued, "[i]t would be ironic if le-
thal weapons were employed because ambiguities in international law
prevented the use of non-lethal weapons.''
The new area of "non-lethal" weapons presents an opportunity for
international law to avoid unacceptable alternatives: international law
either simply reflects the true ugliness of State practice, or it acts in fu-
tility to prevent ugly State practice. The opportunity is for international
law to be useful in guiding State practice towards an acceptable condi-
tion that reflects military and humanitarian considerations. This is,
however, an opportunity more easily conceptualized than achieved. The
values underpinning rules of international law are not often shared by
States and non-State actors in the international system. It is simply fool-
ish to believe that the respectable intentions behind the "non-lethal"
weapons movement are or will be widely shared around the world, par-
ticularly during times of armed conflict.
"Non-lethal" weapons emerge into a situation already marked by
great tension between international law and the realities of international
politics. Nowhere is this tension more serious than in times of armed
conflict. This is why there should and will be tension between interna-
tional law and the development and use of "non-lethal" weapons.
Without this tension, benign motivations behind "non-lethal" weapons
development will quickly be drowned or corrupted into malevolent
designs that adversely affect the lives and hopes of peoples. With "non-
lethal" weapons, there is the danger present in all political and military
178. Doswald-Beck, supra note 158, at 27.
179. See id.
180. See id.; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinions, ICJ Rep. 226 (1996)(discussing the legality of the use of nuclear weapons by
States).
181. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE,
NON-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES: MILITARY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS, 1995, at xi.
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situations that, as Yeats put it, the best lack all conviction, while the
worst are full of passionate intensity. International law cannot prevent
the path to hell being paved with malevolent intentions, but it can per-
haps help us prevent paving that path with good intentions.
